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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Both Japan and the Russian Federation still claim rightful ownership of a small
group of islands between Japan's Hokkaido Island and the Russian Federation's
Northern Kuril Islands. Russia seized the islands in the course of World War II. The
disposition of the islands has prevented the two countries from signing a peace treaty.
The Russian Federation has shied away from official discussions concerning the
islands that are; 1) a part of its strategic nuclear bastion, 2) a source of future economic
development, and 3) a pawn in the internal political battle between moderates and
liberals, and conservatives and nationalists. All Russians recognize that normal relations
with Japan will not be possible until the island dispute is settled and a peace treaty is
signed. The objectives of this thesis concentrate on the political, economic, strategic, and
social importance of the Kuril Islands ownership debate among the Russians themselves
as an indication of the post-Cold War international relations between Moscow and
Tokyo.
Historical background of the Kuril Islands issue is provided as an introduction of the
controversy. The research then turns to the political, economic, strategic, and social
issues of the internal debates during 1992. The political interests and foreign policy
section explores the political aspects of the debate and the internal political struggle for
power in the Russian Federation. Economic perspectives are outlined in the next section
followed by the strategic and security dimensions of the debate. The Russian people's
view and public opinion polling information are provided in the next section. Each
chapter ends with a summary of the Russian perspectives of the territorial dispute
vn
within the context of that chapter. The conclusion includes prospects for the future and
implications for the Pacific Basin countries.
At this writing, the Russian Federation and Japan have not signed a peace treaty and
the South Kuril Islands remain in the hands of the Russians. After one year
improvement in Russo-Japanese relations has not increased significantly but there have
been signs that both sides are willing to consider compromises and that negotiations on
not only the island dispute, but also economic and security issues, will continue.
This does not suggest that the territorial demarcation issue will be resolved or a
peace treaty signed during this century. What the evidence does suggest are continued
bilateral discussions on many important matters in an atmosphere that is seemingly
cooperative and cordial, although reserved.
During 1992 both countries linked political, economic, and security issues together.
For example, Russia still wants American troop levels reduced in the area and to be
assured that Japan's Self-Defense Forces are not a threat to Russia's Far East. Japan is
still concerned about the level of Russian military troops and equipment positioned east
of the Urals throughout Siberia and the Far East.
A combination of internal activities and events inside Russia will determine when
and how the dispute will be settled. The rebirth of nationalism, disagreement upon the
perceptions of their national interests, the battles for political power, and the new weight
given to the Russian people's opinions in policy-making are still struggles that the
Russian leaders have not resolved. Until these issues are resolved Japan must be patient,
as she has been for the past forty-eight years. The prospects are favorable for resolving
the island issue and signing a peace treaty during the first half of the next century.
vin
I. INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
The Russian view of the Kuril Islands dispute must be interpreted in the
debate over foreign policy that was ongoing in the Russian Federation during
1992 and will continue into this year. Both Japan and the Russian Federation
have historical claims to ownership of the small group of disputed islands
between Japan's Hokkaido Island and the Russian Federation's Northern Kuril
Islands (Figure 1). Moscow's present claim to the islands, however, is based on
their occupation and retention as a consequence of an act of war. Moscow sees
its presence in the Kurils as similar to the United States in Okinawa.
The Russian Federation has shied away from official discussions concerning
the islands that are; 1) a part of its strategic nuclear bastion, 2) a source of future
economic development, and 3) a pawn in the political battle between moderates
and liberals, and conservatives and nationalists. Moderate-liberals are insistent
that the new Russia must become a democratic nation accepted in the world
community of nations without losing their status as a great power. Conservative-
nationalists believe the territorial integrity of Russia has already been defaced by
the break-up of the Soviet Union and refuse to accept giving away more Russian
land. All Russians recognize that normal relations with Japan will not be possible
until the island dispute is settled and a peace treaty is concluded.
Source: David Rees, Soviet Border Problems: China and Tapan (London:
Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1982), p. 20.
Figure 1. The Kuril Islands
The objectives of this research paper will concentrate on the political,
economic, strategic, and social importance of the Kuril Islands ownership debate
among the Russian themselves as an indication of the post-Cold War international
relations between Tokyo and Moscow. Historical background (Chapter II) of the
Kuril Islands issue will be provided as an introduction to the controversy as
viewed by the Russians in the post-Cold War world. The paper will then turn to
the political, economic, strategic, and social issues of the internal debates during
1992. The political interests and foreign policy section (Chapter III) explores the
political aspects of the Kuril Islands issue and the internal political struggle for
power in the Russian Federation. Economic perspectives are outlined in the next
section (Chapter IV) followed by the strategic and security dimensions of the
debate (Chapter V). The Russian people's views and public opinion polling
information are provided in the next section (Chapter VI). The conclusion
(Chapter VII) provides a summary of the Russian perspectives of the territorial
dispute, prospects for the future, and implications for the Pacific Basin countries.
In this study of Russian perspectives of the Kuril Islands dispute, the weight
of various aspects is uncertain due to the, yet to be decided, foundation and
direction of the Russian Federation's foreign and domestic policies. The internal
debates on what are their national interests, what the post-Soviet foreign policy
foundation should be, and how to achieve acceptance in the world community of
nations are ongoing. The debates have tilted first one way then the opposite, like
a teeter-totter. Even more significant is the domestic struggle for power between
the Russian parliament and, Boris Yeltsin, the duly elected President of the
Russian Federation.
The argument presented will suggest that Russia, due to her refusal to
resolve the Kuril Islands issue with Japan, is clinging to political, economic, and
military philosophies and policies that reflect pre-breakup Soviet policies in
addressing international relations with Japan. This not only hurts Russia's future
development in the Pacific Rim but acts as an obstacle for cooperative,
interdependent ties between all the industrialized countries of both the West and
East. Does the newly independent Russian Federation really want to become a
member of the community of nations? Is it possible to become integrated into the
Western state system while refusing to negotiate a settlement of the Kuril Islands
territorial issue and without signing a peace treaty with Japan?
B. IMPORTANCE
The impact of the relationship between Tokyo and Moscow on the stability,
cooperation, and security in the Pacific Basin is of great significance. This is true
for the countries surrounding the Pacific Rim and for the rest of the world.
American views of the "New World Order" usually cite the Pacific Basin as one
of three economic centers of the twenty-first century. "This vision may well
become reality given the economic transformations and tremendous rates of
growth that have taken place across the Pacific Basin over the past 20 years." 1
During this period political, trade and investment, and cultural interests in the
countries of the Pacific Rim, including the United States, have also grown.
In this era of a post-Cold War world, Russia is building on past relationships
and seeking new partnerships, especially economic partners, to the East. Russian
officials are aware that the economies of this region are the fastest growing in the
world and Russia is in desperate need of trade, investment, foreign markets, aid
and humanitarian assistance, and security agreements. Both Japan and the
Russian Federation are potentially very powerful, economically, politically, and
militarily, countries that in turn will be an important foundation for cooperation
in the entire region and the world. The first step is the signing of a peace treaty
and, ultimately, resolving the Kuril Islands territorial dispute to the mutual
satisfaction of both countries.
C LITERATURE REVIEW
Many studies and articles, focussing primarily on the relationship between
Moscow and the European capitals and the United States, direct attention to the
territorial dispute concerning the Kuril Islands and the signing of a peace treaty
between Moscow and Tokyo.
1. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Twelfth District, Annual Report, 1993,
p. 4.
Professor John J. Stephan, of the University of Hawaii, has written several
books that deal directly with the Kuril Islands and the relationship between the
Japanese and the Russians. Nearly twenty years ago Stephan wrote:
No comprehensive study of the Kuril Islands exists - but not for want of
interest. Russians and Japanese have written about the arc since the
seventeenth century and feel an abiding concern for it today. Yet linguistic
and (more recently) ideological barriers have fragmented scholarship in
general and historiography in particular. Many Russian and Japanese
writers dealing with the Kurils betray an insularity characteristic of their
subject. They refrain from using (or are unable to use) each other's sources.
They tend to elevate their own country's claims and achievements at the
expense of the other's. Some confine themselves to specialized inquiries.
As a result, admirable monographs have appeared on Kuril Ainu and Kuril
ornithology but no integrated treatment of the arc's past and present is
available in any language. 2
One study of particular interest is David Rees, The Soviet Seizure of the
Kuriles.3 As the title suggests, Rees work is a study of the Kurils in 1945 with
specific attention given to the "decisions at Yalta." His primary hypothesis is that
the Soviets illegally seized possession of the Kuril Islands at the end of World
War II. He discounts the "legality" of an act of war.
Another specific work dedicated to the relations between Tokyo and
Moscow is Savitri Vishwanathan's Normalization of Tapanese Soviet Relations:
1945-1970 .4 Vishwanathan observes that "geographic closeness breeds special
2 John S. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 1.
David Rees, The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1985).
4 Savitri Vishwanathan, Normalization of Japanese-Soviet Relations: 1945-1970
(Tallahassee: The Diplomatic Press, 1973).
interests between nations. Hence, even before Japan opened her doors to the
West, she had to reckon with the presence of Russia."5 He attempts "to
determine whether in the postwar era, Japan was just a pawn in the American-
Soviet conflict or whether she did try to formulate a positive policy towards the
USSR on her own independent judgment."6 Eight pages of the one-hundred
forty-three pages in his book are devoted to the Northern Territories. Other
works on the same subject reflect the same proportions.
Most of the other publications on this subject deal with the foreign policies
of each country or the military-strategic issues of the Pacific Basin. 7 A short
account of the relations between Tokyo and Moscow is provided, usually in the
interest of the United States and the importance that America should place in the
Pacific Rim in her own foreign policy positions. Little attention is paid to Russian
points of view.
Interestingly, two student theses were found in the Dudley Knox Library at
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey dealing with the subject matter of this
paper. The first one focuses on a specialized part of the relations between Tokyo
and Moscow, the economic relationship. In his thesis "Japan-USSR Trade,
Technology Transfer, and Implications for U.S.," David L. Trombley "delineates





A listing of these publications is included in the bibliography of this paper.
economic foundation"8 of the trade and technology transfer between the Soviet
Union and Japan. Since this is a topic-specific study it is not surprising that only
three pages out of one-hundred thirty-six pages of text are devoted to the Kuril
Islands dispute.
The second thesis, and more relevant one to my research, completed by
Michael A. Thompson (June 1982) deals directly with the issue of the Kuril
Islands. In his study, "The Northern Territories: Case Study in Japanese-Soviet
Relations," Thompson presents a case study of the Northern Territories, South
Kuril Islands, dispute and attempts "to illuminate some of the salient differences
in the national patterns of Japan and the Soviet Union."9 His hypothesis focuses
on the territorial problem existing due to Japan's and the Soviet Union's "radically
different paradigms - disparities in their historical, economic, political, geo-
strategic, and philosophical existence."10
As is evident by a review of the literature there is a void in the research of
this area especially with the unprecedented occurrence in December of 1991, the
breakup of the Soviet Union. There is a need to explore and examine the
relationship between two potentially powerful countries of the Pacific Basin, Japan
and the newly independent Russian Federation. Although less studied, Russia,
David L. Trombley, Captain, U. S. Army, "Japan-USSR Trade, Technology
Transfer, and Implications for U.S." (June 1988), p. 4.
Michael A. Thompson, Captain, U. S. Army, "The Northern Territories: Case




beyond her European ties, is also an Asian country. Russia has direct access to
the Pacific Ocean and is a potential trading partner and political-military ally of
all the countries of the Pacific Rim, including the United States.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. OVERVIEW
Since the end of World War II, Tokyo and Moscow have never signed a
peace treaty nor have the international relations between the two countries been
smooth and cooperative. A primary reason is the territorial dispute involving
possession of part or all of the Kuril Islands (known by the Japanese as the
Northern Territories and by the Russians as the South Kuril Islands).
The economic, strategic, political, and social interest in the Islands, which
string between the southern end of Kamchatka and the northern part of
Hokkaido, has been in the past and will continue to be very important to both
countries. The significance of Siberia and the Russia Far Easfs proximity to Asian
and Pacific countries creates objective conditions for extensive ties. 'As
Commerce Minister N. P. Rumianstev wrote Tsar Alexander I in 1803, "Nature
itself, placing Russia next to Japan and affording them access to each other by sea,
has given us trade advantages over all other trading states"." 11
11 John J. Stephan and V. P. Chichkanov, eds., Soviet-American Horizons on the
Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), p. 40.
10
B. PRE-WORLD WAR II
Exploration of the Kuril Islands goes back to the seventeenth century when
both Japanese and Russian explorers were commissioned by their governments
to seek new lands. Territories that would not only feed their territorial
expansionist philosophies but provide a source of revenue in resources and taxes.
By 1644, the Russians reached the pacific littoral. Exploitation of the marine and
natural resources of the North Pacific not only by Japan and Russia, but also
several European countries and the United States, continued into the 1800s.
Three elements have dominated the encounter between Japan and Russia
since the beginning of the eighteenth century. The first was the
commercial/economic interest. Next came the problem of territorial
delimitation. The third was the impact of the international environment,
especially the behaviour of third parties, including the United States, China,
Britain, France and Holland. 12
Commercial and economic interests were primarily pursued by the Russians.
They used the Kuril Islands as a kind of stepping stone to Japan. The Japanese
showed no interest in foreign trade and continued to be a closed society,
unwilling to open their doors to virtually everyone until the early part of the
nineteenth century.
Experts of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in an article
published during August 1992 that:
12 Wolf Mendl, "Stuck in a Mould: The Relationship Between Japan and the
Soviet Union," The International Relations of Tapan, ed. Kathleen Newland
(London: MacMillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1990), pp. 174-5.
11
The Russians were assimilating the Kuril Islands from the late 17th to the
early 18th centuries through Kamchatka from the north, the Japanese from
the south. In this case it is clear that the primordial population nationality
were the Ainu. These islands cannot be considered either native Russian or
native Japanese territory. Simultaneously, colonization of the Kuriles by the
two sides went on. As a result, it came about that Urup and other islands
to the north were possessions of Russia, and Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and
Habomai belonged to Japan. There are documents that testify to the fact
that in the early 19th century Russia consented to such a division of spheres
of influence. 13
It was not until 1855 that the first treaty, the Treaty of Shimoda, involving
the Russians and the Japanese was signed laying an official basis for Russo-
Japanese trade. This treaty was part of the general treaty agreement following
Admiral Perry's opening of Japan. It diverted a conflict between the two
countries by establishing an agreed upon border line, just south of the island of
Irup, with each country receiving ownership of a specific portion of the Kurils.
This agreement specified that Japan would have sovereignty over the four
southernmost islands - Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomai (a cluster of
small islands that the Russians identify as the Little Kuril Chain). Sakhalin Island
would be jointly controlled with settlers from both countries welcomed to become
inhabitants with joint fishing and hunting rights.
The Treaty of Shimoda also "provided for the establishment of diplomatic
relations and the opening of three Japanese ports to Russian vessels." 14 Three
13
"Kuril Islands Dispute Viewed: Opinions of 'MFA Experts' Considered,"
924C2108A Moscow Rossiyskiye Vesti in Russian 11 Aug 92 p 2 (FBIS-USR-92-111,
30 August 1992, p. 53).
14 Stephan and Chichkanov, op. cit, p. 41.
12
years later a commercial treaty, similar to the Harris Treaty15 with the United
States, was signed granting trade, extraterritorial rights for Russian citizens, and
tariff schedules. Russian expectations for trade with Japan went unfulfilled.
"Ignorance about each other's markets and logistic obstacles constrained the level
of exchanges."16
The Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed in 1875, amended the Shimoda Treaty
in several ways. The Russians had decided that their primary interests lay in
Sakhalin Island. It is a large island with many resources and is closer to the
Russian mainland. The Treaty of St. Petersburg granted all the Kuril Islands to
the Japanese and Russia would have the sole right of ownership of Sakhalin
Island.
Later in the nineteenth century, the demand for sources of energy and raw
materials to feed its industrialization and militarization drove the expansion of the
Japanese empire. Japan's main thrust was toward Korea, Manchuria, and China
but they were also interested in the island of Sakhalin. By the Treaty of
The Harris Treaty (July 29, 1858) was negotiated by Townsend Harris, first U.S.
consul to Japan. The document "secured commercial and diplomatic privileges
for the U.S. in Japan and constituted the basis for Western economic penetration
of Japan. . . it provided for the opening of six ports to U.S. trade, in addition to
those opened in 1854 by the Treaty of Kanagawa; it also exempted U.S. citizens
living in the ports from the jurisdiction of Japanese law and arranged for
diplomatic representation and a tariff agreement between the U.S. and Japan."
The New Encyclopedia Britannica (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.,




Portsmouth, Japan claimed the southern half of Sakhalin, together with Russian
interests in South Manchuria as prizes of war. With the completion of the Trans-
Siberian railway (1916) in Russia, commercial interests between Japan and Russia
slightly increased. Japan's total foreign trade with Russia amounted to only a
"small proportion."17 Russian interests in Asia were also limited to the demands
of European diplomacy and the growth of revolutionary movements within
Russia.
For the Russians the economic link with Japan was far more important for
meeting the needs of the Russian population scattered along the Sea of Okhotsk
and the Japan Sea, and the development of Siberia. The Tsarist government took
"active measures to promote peasant migration from European Russia to Siberia
and Far East" 18 as early as the 1880s. This was the beginning of a battle
between the two countries for rights over the coal and oil deposits of Sakhalin
and fishing rights in the surrounding waters. Though, by 1903, bilateral trade
had reached approximately $6 million, "with Russia enjoying a favorable balance
of about $2 million."19 By 1910 Russia, with less than 1 percent share of Japan's
market, still was not a leading trade partner of Japan.
After the humiliating defeat of the Russians during the Russo-Japanese War
in 1905 and the long period of Japanese occupation of Eastern Siberia into the
17 Mendl, op. cit.




early 1920s, the Russians began rebelling. After a raid on Japanese forces by
partisans in 1920, the Japanese took control of the northern half of Sakhalin
Island. By this time the Soviets were fed up and under Stalin were growing
stronger, and in 1925 forced the Japanese out of northern Sakhalin. The Treaty
of Portsmouth signed in 1905 was not altered. Japan retained ownership of the
entire Kuril Island chain and the southern half of Sakhalin. The USSR retained
ownership of the northern half of Sakhalin Island.
During World War I Russia had been supplied by Japan with "great
quantities of material [primarily clothing and military ordnance] and food and
had become its principal customer."20 After the Bolsheviks came to power trade
declined but by the end of the 1920s had increased. Disputes over fisheries and
Soviet shortages of currency prevailed.
"Japan exploited Russian weaknesses during 1918-25 in more ways than
intervention in Siberia alone would suggest."21 With protection provided by the
Imperial Navy, the Japanese fished in Russian waters. Those Japanese poachers
that the Russians caught were released when Japanese warships cut tow lines and
the Japanese are accused of intimidating all Soviet vessels passing through the




21 John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Tapanese Frontier in the Pacific,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 130.
15
By the late 1920s Japanese concessions promoted the development of
northern Sakhalin oil and Kamchatka fisheries. This helped to promote the
region's economy and restore confidence in the bilateral trade relations between
the two countries. Nevertheless fishing disputes were part of strained relations
between the two countries.
Relations severely deteriorated in the early 1930s. Japan, a traditional but
limited trading partner, "pursued policies which resulted in an aggravation of
relations with the USSR."22 Stalin ordered the Siberian and Far East areas built-
up and strengthened during the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-7). Military
personnel were moved into the area along with a small number of gunboats. The
submarine base at Poset Bay was reactivated in 1933 and new submarine bases
were opened at Vladivostok, Nikolaevsk, De Kastries, Petropavlovsk, and on the
Komandorskii Islands. This relatively small and new Russian fleet could not
possibly master the Imperial Navy but served as a deterrent to the Japanese
fishermen and to the intimidation by the Japanese Fleet.
C WORLD WAR II
Once the war in the Pacific broke out, the Kurils became a matter of strategic
importance with three countries vying for possession. This was the beginning of
the dispute over the Kurils that still lingers between Japan and the Russian
Federation. Japan and the Soviet Union signed a Neutrality Pact in 1942. The
22 Stephan and Chichkanov, op. cit, p. 120.
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Pact "would encompass mutual respect for each other's territory and neutrality
in the event of attack by one or more powers."23 Every five years the Neutrality
Pact would be reviewed and renewed "if neither signatory gave notice of
cancellation during the fifth year."24
When the Soviet Union repudiated the Neutrality Pact on 9 August 1945 by
declaring war on Japan, the Yalta accords, a secret agreement, had already been
signed by the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR. The USSR's repudiation
of the Neutrality Pact was not in accordance with the provisions agreed to by the
two countries. In February 1945 at the Yalta Conference the USSR was promised
possession of the Kuril Island chain in exchange for entering into the Pacific War
against Japan and "Russia's claims should be 'unquestionably fulfilled' after
Japan's defeat."25
The Potsdam Declarations of August 1945, which Japan accepted on 14
August, limited Japan territorial sovereignty to the four main islands of Honshu,




25 Mendl, op. cit, p. 178.
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Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku and "such minor islands as we determine."26
Japan committed herself to this declaration by the Act of Capitulation.27
On 8 August the Soviet Union entered the war in the Pacific. This was after
the America bombing of Hiroshima and six days before the surrender of Japan.
Russians began occupying the Kurils on 18 August, after the signing of the
Potsdam Declarations. Amid the confusion of secret agreements, signed by
Roosevelt, and Truman's subsequent non-specific delineation of Soviet-Japanese
border lines in the Kurils, the Soviet forces occupied the entire Kuril Islands.
Soviet occupation included the four islands nearest Hokkaido which had
never been considered part of Russian territory in any of the earlier treaties
signed by the two countries. But World War II "afforded the opportunity [for the
Soviet Union] to gain by a shrewd combination of diplomacy and force what
Japan would never have yielded in times of peace"28 during the last two
centuries.
D. DURING THE COLD WAR
On 25 February 1947 the Kurils were formally integrated as a part of the
USSR. During this year approximately 17,000 Japanese who lived on the islands
26 Excerpt from Stephan, op. cit., p. 245: The Potsdam Declarations - signed by
China, Great Britain, the United States (26 July 1945), and by the Soviet Union (9
August 1945).
27
"Kuril Islands Dispute Viewed," op. cit.
28 Stephan, op. cit, p. 198.
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were deported - "driven forcibly from the Kurils."29 Occupation of the islands
and the deportation of the Japanese were all legal acts carried out as part of the
reward for victory in war.
In 1949, the Japanese released their first official government position paper
on the Islands. It said that the Yalta Agreement had no basis in international law
and claimed the four southern Islands as the territory of Japan. One year later
the People's Republic of China (PRC) issued a statement in support of the USSR's
claim to the disputed islands. There was no agreement to these statements by the
Soviets.
During the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951 Japan agreed to
"renounce all rights and claims to southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands."30
The USSR was not a signatory of the Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco and
"this treaty clearly envisages that it does not grant a nonsignatory country any
rights."31 Japan later claimed that the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not include
the four southern islands since, in their view, these four islands had never been
part of the Kuril chain.
29 Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Kunadze by Yuriy Makartsev;
date and place not given: "Are Russian Diplomats Sinners or Saints?" 924C2206A
Moscow Rabochava Tribuna in Russian 21 Aug 92 pp 1, 3 (FBIS-URS-92-111, 30
August 1992, p. 58).
30 Stephan, op. cit, p. 199.
31
"Letter to Pravda " from Japanese Embassy in Russia: "From Japan's Vantage
Points" - first three paragraphs are introduction: PM2707123792 Moscow Pravda
in Russian 25 Jul 92 p 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-145, 28 July 1992, p. 16).
19
A major breakthrough in the normalization of their relations happened in
1956. A peace declaration between the two countries was signed on 19 October.
The declaration provided:
for an end of the state of war, restoration of diplomatic relations, regulation
of mutual relations according to the UN Charter, Soviet support of Japan's
entry in the UN, repatriation of Japanese detainees, mutual reUnquishment
of the right for reparations, early negotiations for concluding a Treaty of
Commerce and Navigation, affirmation of the validity of the Fisheries
Agreement signed on 14 May 1956, and early negotiation of a peace treaty
followed by the return of Habomai and Shikotan.32
Future talks collapsed as the Soviets continued to expand the conditions of
agreement and "at least in part as a result of pressure exerted on the Japanese by
Washington."33 By 1960, the USSR demanded that all foreign troops, the
Americans, must leave Japan before negotiations could resume on the return of
any of the islands and the signing of a peace treaty. Six months later the Soviets
withdrew their ground troops from the four South Kuril Islands. Soviet troops
returned to the islands, specifically Kunashir and Iturup, in 1978 as a show of
intimidation and pressure on the Japanese to not sign a treaty with China. The
Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed on 12 August 1978 in
Peking. The Soviet buildup in the Far East and in the Kurils continued into the
1980s.
32 Savitri Vishwanathan, Normalization of Japanese-Soviet Relations: 1945-1970,
(Tallahassee: The Diplomatic Press, 1973), p. 85.
33 Stephen Foye, "The Struggle Over Russia's Kuril Islands Policy," RFE/RL
Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 36 (11 September 1992), p. 35.
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In 1961 Japan declared that the islands of Kunashir and Iturup are not and
never were a part of the Kuril Island chain. Khrushchev responded by declaring
the issue settled. The Soviets considered the Kurils a non-issue for the next
twenty-five years except for a few specific gestures of reconciliation presented by
both sides.
First, in 1964 "Khrushchev made plain to a visiting Japanese parliamentary
delegation [that] he was reluctant to return even Habomai and Shikotan until the
Americans pulled out of Japan."34 Japan made plain that the Islands were a
subject of negotiation along with the lure of economic collaboration.35 The
Soviets did not take the bait.
The second attempt occurred in 1969. Foreign Minister Aichi Kiichi,
stopping in Moscow on his way to Washington, did not make a dent in the
steadfast arguments of both sides. The Soviets "feared that the revision of
national boundaries established during the Second World War [Great Patriotic
War as the Soviets call it] in one place, might revive territorial issues
elsewhere."36
The Soviet offer, in January 1972, to return the Habomais and Shikotan in
exchange for Japan's renunciation of claims to Iturup and Kunashir and
adherence to Brezhnev's collective security plan was rejected by the Japanese. In






recently released documents in Russia, the Russian press has reported the 1973
plan was actually "blocked by the opposition of the [Soviet! military."37 The
Russian article says that "Fukuda . . . promised to consider the proposal."38
According to the same reference, Tokyo later "made clear its intention to agree
to an intermediary settlement of the territorial dispute between the two countries,
without specifying what it meant by intermediary."39 However, Soviet support
for this agreement was later withdrawn "probably under pressure from the
military commandment."40
A year and half later, the Japanese left a Tanaka-Brezhnev summit meeting
under the impression that the Northern Territories issue was still negotiable. But
by 1976 Gromyko's offer to exchange Shikotan and Habomai for a Japanese
promise not to sign a treaty with the PRC, containing a anti-hegemony clause,
was rejected by Japan.
In 1978, the Soviets unilaterally published a proposed treaty of friendship
and good neighborliness with no mention of the territorial dispute. Again the
Japanese rejected the offer and two years later brought the issue before the United
37
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Nations General Assembly. This action did not bring forth any cooperation from
the Soviets.
After 1945, absence of diplomatic recognition and the continued Soviet
military build-up in the Far East constrained the expansion of Soviet-Japanese
trade. Though, "both governments learned to be realistic and not to allow their
differences on one issue to affect all aspects of their relations"41 including
economics.
A few specific examples are provided. Three-year trade agreements began
in 1960 and, in 1966, the format was changed to five-year plans. In ten years,
1960 to 1970, the total trade increased from $440 million ($230 million in imports
and $210 million in exports) to almost $3 billion.42 Beginning in 1960 Japan also
extended to the Soviet Union the right of deferred payments. This increase in
total Japanese-Soviet trade was enhanced by the exploration of mutual needs and
the exchange of information regarding trade and industry through trade fairs and
visits of trade and industrial missions.
A Japan-Soviet Technical Cooperation Agreement was signed on 5 June 1967.
In addition, the Japan-Soviet Economic Committee adopted a policy of "develop
and import."43 Plans that were considered included projects to develop the
forest resources in the Soviet Far East, the development of copper mines in





Udokan and of oil fields in Western Siberia, the laying of pipelines between
Western Siberia and Nakhodka, the development of natural gas on Sakhalin, and
the expansion of Nakhodka and other Siberian ports.44 Some of these plans were
executed and a few of them were dropped from consideration.
The USSR granted facilities to Japan Airlines to fly over Siberia en route to
Europe in 1967. Until 1970 only joint operation was allowed, when independent
passenger flights were authorized. This was a goodwill gesture from the Soviet
Union toward Japan and the Japanese line was the first foreign line to be granted
such permission.
At the end of WWII Japan's access to the rich fishing areas of the Kurils and
Sakhalin Island was severely restricted and the Soviets used this to then-
advantage to neutralize Japanese irredentists. Despite the territorial problem
some Japanese fisherman collaborated with the Soviets to enter prime fishing
areas.
45 In March 1977, both Japan and the USSR declared 200-mile economic
zones. Two months later they signed the Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Agreement.
But the fishing restrictions have remained a source of contention for Japan
although restrictions have been lifted somewhat and several agreements signed.
44
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E. THE GORBACHEV YEARS
The Soviet Union continued denying the existence of a territorial problem
up until the time of President Mikhail Gorbachev. When Gorbachev visited Japan
in April 1991, he admitted that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan
required the establishment of a state border line incorporating the "Northern
Territories." Though his trip did not "bring about a breakthrough for the
normalization and dramatic improvement of the bilateral relations, it provided an
extremely important occasion to pursue a dramatic improvement in the Japan-
Soviet relationship."46
His trip was preceded by several trips by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze,
beginning in January 1986, and the Peace Treaty Working Group met seven times
after February 1988. The top priority was a conclusion of a peace treaty which
included the territorial issue.
As a result of Gorbachev's visit a joint statement was released on the future
development of Soviet-Japanese relations as a whole with the "concept of an
expanding equilibrium, which Japan had proposed in the past."47 Based on this
concept fifteen documents were drawn up, including agreements on persons
detained in Soviet camps for prisoners of war, cooperation related to technical
assistance for reform efforts for the Soviet economy, and a memorandum on
46 Diplomatic Bluebook 1991: Tapan's Diplomatic Activities (Japan: Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1991), p. 316.
47
Ibid.
cooperation to alleviate the effects by the Chernobyl-disaster on the health of the
local population.
The joint release included a statement that the four Kuril Islands of
Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Etorofu were the subject of a territorial dispute
to be settled in the peace treaty. Clearly, the territorial issue was now recognized
as a problem to be resolved. The Japanese were very clear that they had "no
intention of postponing the settlement of this problem" and both countries must
"show courage to make a political decision . . . that would answer the interests
of the peoples of both countries."48
Several items in the joint statement were eventually implemented, including
exchange visits by the residents of the four islands and Japanese nationals and in
the future the trips would be allowed with a visa, and the reduction of Soviet
troops stationed on the four islands.
Regarding the territorial issue, the Japanese continued to demand a political
decision to settle the issue, however, the Soviet delegation only indicated that the
Soviet Union was prepared to continue discussions on the problem of
demarcation of the territory.
Five months after Gorbachev's historical trip to Japan and one month after
the coup d'etat, Acting Chairman of the Soviet Union, Ruslan Khasblatov, visited




Republic to Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu. The letter contained a proposal to
resolve the territorial problem that included: "(1) the differentiation between the
victorious and defeated countries in World War II should be abandoned, (2) the
settlement of the Territorial Issue should be based on law and justice, and (3) the
period of reaching such a settlement through five stages as proposed by President
Yeltsin in January 1990 should be shortened."49
The Japanese had announced a suspension of all assistance to the Soviet
Union immediately after the coup d'etat. By this time Yeltsin and his officials
were rapidly gaining influence over many policy concerns of the Soviet Union.
When they received Yeltsin's proposal the Japanese were confident that a
settlement of the territorial issue would be soon. After Gorbachev's resignation
in December 1991, both Japanese and Russian officials set to work on resolving
the Kuril Islands territorial dispute to the satisfaction of both countries.
In May 1992, Russian People's Deputy Aleksey Surkov wrote:
The anniversary of the trip to Japan by the former president of the former
USSR, M. Gorbachev, has vanished quietly and unremarked in the annals
of history. Even though it is difficult to overestimate the value of that event
for the subsequent development of Russian-Japanese relations. And not
because it was the first visit to the Land of the Rising Sun by a
representative of our country of such high rank since Tsar Nikolay II
ascended the throne in 1891. The Tokyo summit meeting removed barriers





"Conclusion of Peace Treaty With Japan Urged," 924C1547A Moscow
Nezavisimava Gazeta in Russian 16 May 92 p 4 (FBIS-USR-92-067, 5 June 1992,
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F. SUMMARY
In terms of value, Japan's trade with the Soviet Union has never amounted
to more than 2 percent of its total foreign trade. On the other hand, by the late
1980s "Japan was the third largest trading partner of the Soviet Union, next to
West Germany and Finland."51 For Japan the USSR "occupies a much lower
position among Japan's trading partners."52
Soviet-Japanese trade fell during the late 1970s and early 1980s but this
seems to reflect "the status of contracts under the system of compensation
agreements than on the prevailing political climate."53 Even during the 'Siberian
boom' period, the proportion of trade with the Soviet Union in relation to Japan's
overall trade never exceeded 3 percent. 54
Japan has vetoed Soviet entry to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC), Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other
international economic organizations. Many, inside and outside of Japan and the
p. 3).
51 Tapan and the United States: Troubled Partners in a Changing World, Institute
for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. (Washington: Brassey's (US), Inc., 1991), p. 58.






USSR, believe the development of the Soviet Far East will be impossible without
Japan's cooperation which they have refused to give.
Beyond economic relations, political and cultural expressions of goodwill
occurred by both sides during the last twenty-five years. This suggests that
although a peace treaty has never been signed and the Kuril Islands remain a
territorial dispute between the two countries, Japan and the Soviet Union
maintained relations on a somewhat normal but tentative basis during the Cold
War period. "The restoration of diplomatic relations set the pace for the
strengthening of economic ties, neither country allowing ideological differences
to interfere with trade."55
Under Gorbachev, the USSR prepared a new Asian security policy but Japan
"stands as a major stumbling block" for the new policy.56 Until the late 1980s
"the Soviets treated Japan with disdain as a second-rate country with no military
significance which subserviently followed U.S. foreign policy."57 Thus, Soviet
policy toward Japan was merely an outgrowth of Soviet policy toward the United
States.
Japan is secure in its position as long as the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty
is in effect. Basically, Japan has been in the position of being able to virtually
ignore her neighbor to the north. The Japanese do not plan on making any
55 Vishwanathan, op. cit, p. 144.




concessions regarding the territorial dispute. Japan "takes the position that it is
the Soviet Union that needs Japan more than the other way around."58
Gorbachev could have made a bold concession to Japan by reinstatement of
the 1956 agreement but he failed to do so. As 1991 progressed with Gorbachev's
visit to Japan in April, the coup d-etat in August, and the final break up of the
Soviet Union with Gorbachev's resignation on Christmas Day, the Japanese
believed the territorial dispute would be settled during the next year. By contrast
the newly independent Russian Federation was preparing for major political and




III. POLITICAL INTERESTS AND FOREIGN POLICY
A. OVERVIEW
During Gorbachev's term in office, he and "others in the Soviet elite have
[had] set out to fashion and implement a foreign policy suitable, not for a
superpower in decline, but perhaps for an injured superpower in process of
retraining for future competitions, still with its eye on the gold."59 As the years
went by and the reforms caused great strain on the entire Soviet Union and its
citizens, alternative views surfaced regarding the nature of the Soviet Union's
foreign policy.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the newly independent Russian
Federation emerged the foreign policy and political debates continued.
Apparently Russian foreign policy would be different in a post-Soviet era.
Author Bruce D. Porter predicted four primary sources of change.60 His
assumptions are that the government will continue on a path of transformation
and reorganization, a civil war, antireform coup, or a return to totalitarian rule
59 Roger E. Kanet, Deborah Nutter Miner, Tamara J. Resler, eds., Soviet Foreign
Policy in Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 2.
60 Bruce D. Porter, "A Country Instead of a Cause: Russian Foreign Policy in the
Post-Soviet Era," The Washington Quarterly, Volume 15, Number 3 (Summer
1992).
will not occur, and Russia's foreign policy will tend to become more "Russian" in
nature.
Porter's sources of change are, (1) Russians will abandon the Communist
ideology which was the foundation of Soviet foreign policy before 1992, (2)
internal political reform sustained over time will affect long-standing patterns of
national character and behavior, (3) Russia's foreign policy will be more national
in context due to the implications of a decentralized Commonwealth, and, (4) the
movement from the 'Cold War' attitude of East against West to an "opening of
transcontinental Era of Good Feelings in Europe."61
Porter's predictions have proven to be accurate with one added factor. The
basis for foreign policy is focused on a country's national interests. Russian
foreign policy decision-making during the past year has not been built on an
agreed-upon perception of national interests, goals, or constitutional criteria since
all of these were subject to domestic arguments. Nonetheless, a general foreign
policy has been built upon specific objectives the Russian leaders wish to achieve.
Foreign Minister Kozyrev said policy goals include preservation of a unified
army, human rights, and the protection of the Russian and the Russian-speaking
population in other CIS states. 62 Yeltsin added that it was necessary "to secure
61
Ibid., p. 46.
62 Suzanne Crow, "Russian Federation Faces Foreign Policy Dilemmas," RFE/RL
Research Report (6 March 1992), p. 19.
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Russia's entry into the civilized world community and to enlist maximum support
for efforts toward Russia's transformation."63
The result of this transformation without a clear-cut road to follow resulted
in "Russia's foreign policy [to be] a hotly debated and sometimes emotional
topic"64 during the entire year. By November officials of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs insisted "economic imperatives are now driving the country's foreign
relations."65 Along with the lack of political institutions, the domestic political
battles grew during the year impacting on perceptions about Russia's foreign
policy. A Washington Post correspondent interpreted the events as "showing a
clear and ominous pattern of retrenchment,"66 by Yeltsin both domestically and
in foreign policy.
How does Japan fit into this picture? Clearly both Japan and the Soviet
Union regarded each other as insignificant before the late 1980s. In January 1992,
Vasiliy Saplin, Deputy Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Pacific-Southeast
Asian Nations Bureau, said the Soviets' policies "had been those underestimating
Japan's position and roles" and "Japan was not given priority in the Soviet
63
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Union's global policies."67 Gorbachev's visit to Japan in April 1991 opened the
door for negotiations toward normalization of relations and negotiations on the
peace treaty and territorial dispute.
A poll of five hundred "leaders of public opinion [not clear what this means]
was conducted in June 1992 by the VP service for the study of public opinion."68
Japan, with 11 percent total, placed fifth to the question asking about relations
with which countries should today be the subject of the government of Russia's
main concern. The CIS countries were first with 82 percent, then United States
(44 percent), Germany (23 percent), and other West European countries (21
percent).
Some of the comments in the Russian press regarding Japan and the East
Asian countries include the following:
The political aspects of the Southern Kuril issue matters most, not from the
viewpoint of lofty ideas and ideals, but in the context of Russia's realistic
national interests and pragmatic aims.69
The orientation toward Western values does not mean Russia's orientation
toward the West. The eastern direction of Russian policy is vitally
important for Russia . . . The Eurocentrist foreign policy tradition of Moscow
67
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diplomats and politicians which has taken shape has yet to be overcome, it
is true.
70
Unlike certain experts, who believe the United States is now the main factor
in world politics, they [members of the Moscow State Institute of
International Relations] believe that the world is becoming not unipolar, but
multipolar (they refer to at least three centers of economic and political
power - the United States, West Europe, and Japan).71
The Russian Foreign Ministry and the whole Russian Government, they are
recognizing Japan's position as a world power in not only economic but also
policy matters. We will be formulating our policies from this standpoint.
The Russian Government has declared that it will take, in principle, a new
approach on relations with Japan, and that it will not regard Japan as an
enemy from the past. We have also declared that we will deal with Japan
on the basis of respecting international law and principles of justice.72
The way was paved for meetings and negotiations for Tokyo and Moscow
to move toward normal relations. By the end of the year very little progress was
made toward signing a peace treaty or resolution of the territorial dispute.
B. MEETINGS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS
Early in January the Foreign Ministry outlined Russia's foreign policy
toward Japan. Not surprisingly it dealt exclusively with the peace treaty and
Kuril Islands. The plan recognized the 1956 Joint Declaration that states the
return of two islands, Habomai and Shikotan. This was addressed as a starting
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point for bilateral territorial negotiations and "did not necessarily mean the
immediate and automatic return of the islands."73 In addition, the negotiations
would address the need for "territorial demarcation based on the principles of
legality and justice, and following the norms of international law."74
Another announcement said the "complex economic situation in Russia may
prevent the Russian President from paying a visit [to Japan] until June or July."75
It was also "objectively difficult" for Yeltsin to return all four islands due to public
opposition but that it would be possible to reach an agreement within the
Federation on the return. It was then reported that Yeltsin's trip would probably
be in May. Shortly after that announcement it was confirmed that Yeltsin was
definitely scheduled to make an official visit to Japan during the middle of
September.
The Japanese government did not officially invite Yeltsin to Japan until 11
August. Yeltsin's itinerary included meeting Japan's Emperor Akihito after the
official welcoming ceremony. The first round of talks would then begin with
Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and a second round would be held on 15
September. After that a joint statement on the results of the meetings was to be
73
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published and it was expected a series of agreements would be signed and
released to the public.
On 10 September, four days before he was to be in Japan, President Yeltsin
announced that he would "postpone" his trip. He said, "after taking account of
a range of considerations and of the exchange of views with those in charge of
the government, the Supreme Soviet, and the Security Council,"76 he decided it
would be best to postpone the trip. A new date for a visit to Japan was still not
determined but November or December was mentioned. That was later amended
to "not earlier than next year, since "relations with Japan are more complex than
with other countries" and the Russian president's calendar till the end of the year
is full."
77
A Japanese publication, Kyodo, reported that Yeltsin "cited Japan's stance
on economic assistance to Russia as one of the reasons for his decision to
postpone his scheduled visit to Japan, Russian sources said."78 In the same
release a Russian cabinet minister, who wished to remain anonymous, said that
"a "hysterical anti-Russian campaign" was developing in Japan and that the
76
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president's safety during the visit could not be ensured."79 Also cited were
Russia's domestic and economic problems and the "poor prospect of signing
documents pledging assistance to Russia."80
As was stated on Russian television, "There have been considerably more
foreign then domestic commentaries on the postponement of the visit to Japan.
Officials are not willing to meet with journalists . . ."81 Russian officials were
concerned that future aid talks and scheduled meetings on a variety of topics
would be "postponed" by Japan. This did not prove to be the case as will be
explained in the next section.
Between January and 10 September several meetings were scheduled
between government officials of both countries. Some were held and some were
not. According to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service published during
that period sixteen meetings were scheduled. Five were between Foreign Minister
Kozyrev and Japanese Foreign Minister Watanabe. Three of the meetings were
held in Moscow and two in Tokyo, with the last one in early September in Tokyo.
Two of the meetings were held by a Russian-Japanese Working Group
Commission on resolving the Kurils issue. Both were in Moscow. Three
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trip to Japan. The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
organization traveled to Moscow during May for an economic-political conference.
The National Council of Japanese Governors made a trip to Moscow in late
August. The outcomes of these meetings were words of praise by both sides
about the friendly and cooperative atmosphere, the need to resolve issues for an
early signing of a peace treaty, and economic issues important to both countries.
Rumors abounded with reports of three to twelve to fourteen alternative
plans the Russians had come up with to resolve the territorial demarcation issue
with Japan. At one point it was announced that Yeltsin would revert to a three-
stage plan toward signing a peace treaty. The next month it was announced that
Yeltsin would revert to his original five-stage plan that he proposed in January
1990. Civilians wrote articles proposing everything from Japanese sovereignty-
Russian administration, demanding enormous economic assistance before the
issue would even be discussed, to allowing the International Court of Justice
resolve the issue whose decision must be mutually accepted by both countries.
Yeltsin's five-stage plan included: (1) recognition by the sides of the
existence of a territorial problem (which resulted during Gorbachev's April 1991
visit to Tokyo), (2) demilitarization of the disputed islands, (3) creation of a free
economic zone, (4) conclusion of a peace treaty, and (5) "a final solution to the
problem to be resolved by future generations."82 It appeared that this was the
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favored plan by Yeltsin and his supporters due to the public outcry from the
nationalists, communists, and conservatives who refuse to give up more 'Russian
land.'
The last four scheduled meetings are the most important. One, in Moscow,
was between Yeltsin and the former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone. At the
end of this unofficial visit Yeltsin "showed his strong interest in concluding a
peace treaty by the year 2000"83 that Nakasone had proposed to Yeltsin. Yeltsin
also commented that "it would not be a good idea to raise the territorial dispute
at this time since the Russian people are preoccupied with food shortages and
other urgent domestic issues."84
The other three were officially scheduled meetings between Watanabe and
Yeltsin in Moscow. Two of the meetings, scheduled for 27 January and 4 May,
were canceled by Yeltsin citing urgent matters that had to be attended to. The
last meeting was held on 2 September.
Several important internal meetings were held and announcements made
during July and August before the September Yeltsin-Watanabe meeting. First,
a closed meeting took place on 9 July at the White House. Present were
representatives from the Supreme Soviet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
83
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General Staff, the leadership of Sakhalin Oblast and Khabarovsk Kray, and
unnamed experts and specialists. The meeting was "part of the preparation for
open parliamentary hearings set for 28 July for discussing the constitutional,
territorial, domestic and foreign political, and international aspects of the entire
spectrum of Russian-Japanese relations."85 The press reported that "an argument
of sorts flared up at the meeting"86 concerning the different scenarios presented
in resolving the territorial issue. What specifically was said by whom was not
reported.
Open parliamentary hearings were held as scheduled and a "verbatim
account" was published in Moscow's Rossivskava Gazeta . Twenty-nine people
from all sides of the issue presented their viewpoints, which is probably what also
happened during the closed meeting held earlier in the month. On one side were
those who were intent on adhering to Yeltsin's position of resolving the problem
of territorial demarcation based on legality and justice. One of the opposition's
points focused on national feelings citing the problem can only be resolved when
the "majority of the population agrees to the solution."87 Other points included
85
"Kurils Issue Argued in Closed Meeting," 924C1983A Moscow Nezavisimaya




"Verbatim Account of Closed Parliamentary Hearings on Kurils," 924C2158A
Moscow Rossivskava Gazeta in Russian 14 Aug 92 pp 4-5 (FBIS-USR-92-112, 2
September 1992, p. 5).
41
questioning the legality of the 1956 Declaration, military-strategic concerns, and
the question of Japanese economic assistance.
According to the Russian press the hearings had a two-fold objective. First,
a democratic hearing listening to all sides with the results published were a
welcomed sign of democracy. On the other side, the hearings were seen as
another political battle in many political battles that the Russian people were
witnesses to and experienced the results of during the last seven months. And,
in reality, during the Gorbachev years.
An article submitted by V. Sobakin, Chief of the International Law
Department of the Constitutional Court of the Russia Federation, discussed the
hearings. Sobakin concluded his article with the following statement:
Russia is faced with an entirely definite choice in the development of
relations with Japan: either a civilized renunciation of imperial ambitions
and claims to territorial expansion as one further step toward the
surmounting of the communist legacy and Russia's enhanced international
authority, based on fidelity to the commitments that it has assumed, or
continuation of the former foreign policy, pre-Gorbachevian even, and the
incitement of nationalism and xenophobia, which would inevitably lead to
Russia's international isolation and the world community's increased
misgivings as to the authenticity of our country's democratic regeneration.
False patriotism mixed, in addition, together with far-reaching personal
political ambitions is a poor assistant in the adoption of decisions on the
nature of which the fate of one's own country directly depends. 88
On 20 July a Yeltsin spokesman said during an interview that ""public
opinion in Russia must be changed completely" before a "wise political decision"
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can be made on the territorial issue."89 He characterized public opinion in
Russia "as being traditionally conservative regarding territorial matters."90 He
added that Russia would suffer heavy economic losses if the islands were
returned because they are of great material value. Japan would also enjoy great
profits and Japan was underestimating the economic dimension of the issue. This
was the first time and one of the few comments made on economic interests of
the islands themselves.
Another spokesman for Yeltsin said, during an interview in Tokyo, to
resolve the issue was "an "exceedingly difficult job" due to known public
sentiments in Russia . . . and the possibility of breaking the "territorial deadlock"
during Yeltsin's visit would largely depend on the constructiveness of Tokyo."91
He confirmed that Yeltsin had twelve alternative solutions and believed if Yeltsin
arrived at the conclusion that "Japan lacks necessary understanding of Russian
realities, his [Yeltsin's] stand may become tougher."92
In August, Deputy Foreign Minister Kunadze (known as pro-Japanese)
"expressed hope that restraint, tact and also a respectful attitude to the partner
will from now on be observed in statements by Japanese politicians on issues of
89
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relations with Russia."93 Recent statements by some Japanese politicians were
perceived by the Russians to "present in the distorted light the Russian side's
approach to talks on a peace treaty" and that these attempts "are made to accuse
Russia ungroundlessly of "insincerity"."94
Russian parliament speaker Khasbulatov, who opposed Yeltsin's call for a
plebiscite, said at the end of August, "People in the Russian parliament raise both
hands to vote in favour of a prompt signing of a peace treaty between our
countries. It seems unnatural to me as a politician and a scholar that there is no
peace treaty between Russia and Japan at the end of the 20th century."95 He
made no comment on the fate of the Kuril Islands.
Yeltsin's announcements after the Yeltsin-Watanabe meeting of 2 September
clarified what he wanted to express to the Japanese and to his fellow Russians.
His statements reflected the same tone as earlier statements by other government
officials. In an article in Kyodo Yeltsin is quoted as saying, "Japan has been
putting pressure on Russia economically, politically and psychologically. Given
this situation, it is difficult to resolve the territorial dispute."96 He supposedly
93
"Criticism of 'Tendentious' Japanese Statements," LD0408173692 Moscow Itar-




"Khasbulatov Views Ties With Japanese Governors," LD2408132992 Moscow
Itar-Tass in English 1301 GMT 24 Aug 92 (FBIS-SOV-92-165, 25 August 1992, p.
13).
96
"Yeltsin Remarks on Timing of Return," OW02091 10492 Tokyo Kyodo in
English 1052 GMT 2 Sep 92 (FBIS-SOV-92-171, 2 September 1992, p. 5).
44
also suggested that "Japan's stance on the bilateral territorial dispute over the past
year has overheated public opinion in both Japan and Russia, making it difficult
to resolve"97 the dispute. This report was followed by a similar report on
Moscow Russian Television.98 After comments made during July and August
and then Yeltsin's comments in early September it should not have surprised
anyone when, eight days later, he "postponed" his trip to Tokyo.
C. THE OPPOSITION
It is important to clarify several points. First, no one appears opposed to
Japan and Russia signing a peace treaty. All the resources and comments
analyzed suggest that the Russian people favor signing a peace treaty when
possible. Second, regarding the territorial issue the opinions vary from believing
there is no issue to be resolved and that it should not even be discussed, to
opposition to Yeltsin's methods and plans of resolving what is an actual territorial
dispute.
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(1) Economics "The ruling regime is in an unstable position. Help us, that
is, the regime now and we will settle up later. Maybe with the islands."99 This
is the view many hold that Japan has not been forthcoming with enough
economic assistance and aid and if she does she may be given the islands. In
keeping with that theme, Vice-president Rutskoy suggested "it would be desirable
to improve the infrastructure, especially in the Far East and Siberia . . . Japan
could become a remarkable business partner of Russia and after such mutual
exchanges, it will [then] be possible to effectively solve the territorial dispute."100
(2) Political The opposition parliamentary bloc "Russian Unity" is
concerned with "the efforts to speed up [a] solution to the territorial dispute in
favor of Japan." 101 There are those who perceived that Yeltsin was trying to
hurry up the entire process without regard to the parliament and public opinion.
In a sense they felt he was moving into an authoritarian mode instead of relying
upon the new democratic principles that have been adopted. In addition, people
in this category also thought secret meetings and agreements were happening
between Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and Japanese officials. The "Russian Unity" was the
"Kozyrev's Japan, PRC Visits Assessed," PM2503142192 Moscow
Komsomolskaya Pravda in Russian 24 Mar 92 p 5 (FBIS-SOV-92-059, 26 March
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main force behind calling for open parliamentary hearings on the issue that were
eventually granted by the government.
(3) Referendum The Democratic Party of Russia (DPR) issued a statement
in early August proposing to build relations with Japan as an important goal but
refuted the official Japanese position of no islands - no peace treaty. The DPR
document stated, "Russia is not a country to speak with by means of
ultimatums"102 and that any changes of the Russian borders can only be done
by an all-nation referendum. This group also believed secret meetings were being
held, specifically between Russian Foreign Ministry officials and Japanese officials.
(4) Legal "A political decision adopted without negotiations is unacceptable
for Russia for two reasons. Firstly, it would be authoritarian, based on the force
of power and not on the arguments of international law."103 Secondly, public
opinion would not accept this outcome. "Russia needs a legal, not a political
solution . . . the dispute should be considered by The Hague international court.
The sides have to pledge to abide by its decision."104
(5) Non-Issue The people in this category refuse to acknowledge that a
territorial dispute between Japan and Russia exists. All Russian lands, including
the entire Kuril chain of islands, are native lands. Territorial concessions to
102
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anyone are against common sense and history. Those who favor acknowledging
that a dispute exists are under delusions and unpatriotic. Territorial bargaining
for economic aid or any other reason is completely unjustified and equal to
treason. "A peace treaty with Japan, as the development of Russian-Japanese
good-neighborliness in general, should be the result of both countries' recognition
of the stable and precise borders which took shape as a result of World War
TT 1.105
From January through September, until Yeltsin "postponed" his trip, passions
were flaring, then dying down, then flaring again over the Kuril Islands'
discussions. Some government officials were accused of purposefully "whipping
up emotions in parliament or on the islands themselves" instead of reaching a
compromise that "requires political will and political solutions." 106
D. THE AFTERMATH
On 7 October Yeltsin "stressed that his decision to postpone the visit was
made "because of our inability to surrender the four islands, and to make the visit
and not achieve any results would have been too costly"." 107 The Russian press
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reported that Yeltsin "has expressed absolute certainty that he acted correctly
when he decided to postpone his planned" 108 trip to Tokyo. Yeltsin said "the
visit to Tokyo could take place" 109 if the two sides recognized the 1956
Declaration, returning two islands, after signing of an agreement. Deputy Foreign
Minister Kunadze said "postponing it [the trip] was a political decision which we
in the Foreign Ministry respect and understand. There was no internal
nonacceptance of this decision."110
The Russian media reported on 7 October that the Russian leadership had
unofficially offered Japan to freeze the talks on the territorial dispute for two
years. This was not confirmed.
Reports as to the date for a future trip went from late this year or early next
year, then definitely not in December but certainly early next year. At the end
of November Kozyrev announced that "Yeltsin's visit to Japan is scheduled for the
next year." 111
In early December Miyazawa sent a personal message to Yeltsin saying he
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president to Tokyo." 112 This message was sent in response to a letter from
Yeltsin in November. Supposedly, neither Yeltsin's letter nor Miyazawa's
message contained any reference to the territorial issue.
This was followed by the Working Group beginning consultations again on
16 December. The meeting was the first scheduled after the postponement of
Yeltsin's trip. "The postponement brought about a temporary pause in the
diplomatic dialogue between Moscow and Tokyo"113 but, by the end of 1992, it
looked as though both countries were willing to try again.
E. SUMMARY
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the first democratically elected
Russian President made foreign tours to all of the "big seven" countries except
Japan. Yeltsin has also visited Japan's immediate neighbors, China and South
Korea. The only meeting attended by both Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister
Miyazawa was the G-7 summit meeting held in Munich during July.
Events within the Russian Federation have prevented a complete
normalization of relations as has the perceived Japanese approach of inflexibility
and linking economics with politics. Though by the end of the year the Japanese
112
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were demonstrating a more flexible approach to the negotiations, if not their
demands of the return of all four islands. This is a positive sign for the Russians
who are learning how to live in an open society with a free market,
demilitarization, and privatization. "Whatever the intrinsic merits of the case may
be, one has to reckon with the new domestic sentiment when pursuing a
democratically based foreign policy."114
No clear solution to the dispute is in sight for the Russians which is evident
when Yeltsin said he had twelve approaches to the problem. The many meetings
between the countries are a good sign of continued discussions and a summit
meeting will probably take place in Tokyo this year. This does not mean that a
peace treaty will be signed or the territorial dispute will be resolved in the future.
An agreement may be signed based on Nakasone's suggestion of waiting until the
year 2000 for the signing of a peace treaty.
Russia's domestic politics has continued to be a battle between Yeltsin's way
of resolving problems and opponents who have another way. The Kuril Islands
issue was another political struggle for power not necessarily based on a true
desire to keep the islands but on a desire "to make this into the main trump card
in their [the opposition] fight against the president." 115 This is a good issue to
stir up the people against the leader in power thereby establishing a more
114 Vladimir P. Lukin, "Our Security Predicament," Foreign Policy, Number 88
(Fall 1992), p. 61.
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powerful place for the opposition on the political hierarchy. The territorial
dispute is just one more issue in many issues that Yeltsin chose not to use all his
political weight to settle.
Exploitation of the problem became commonplace during the year but
educating the public as to the entire picture was also commonplace. This
represents a democracy, two or more sides presenting their views to the public.
The "democratic forces in Russia are powerful but not unified or systematic"116
yet. Based on the outcome of the legal aspects of the case the Russian people
may vote to decide the fate of the Kuril Islands. But it would be foolish to expect
people to vote before they are presented all the facts and then can make up their
own minds based on all the information. Continued education programs and
debates are necessary not only regarding this issue but for all the problems
confronting the Russian government and the Russian people during this period
of transformation.
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Mikhail Gorbachev officially announced his resignation as the Soviet Union's
General Secretary on Christmas Day 1991. With his resignation the world was
introduced to a newly independent country called the Russian Federation with
President Boris Yeltsin at the helm. It was proclaimed that the Russian economy
would move from central planning and socialism toward a market economy,
privatization, and capitalist policies. The world was shocked, apprehensive, and,
for most in the West, ecstatic. But after one year of "shock therapy" and tentative
reforms, Russia did not advance as far as was hoped. "Shock therapy" or as one
Professor of Economics has called it, "Shock without therapy,"117 was undertaken
by Yeltsin "in an effort to revitalize the disintegrating economy bequeathed by the
Soviet Communist regime. nils
Expectations were not based on reality. A country cannot convert an entire
political and economic program that was based on militarization to a free flowing
market economy in such a short time. And now the reforms begun during 1992
117 Thomas A. Weisskopf, "Russia In Transition: Perils of the Fast Track to




are waning as the political battles between Yeltsin's moderate democrats and
Congress's conservative hard-liners are intensifying.
By mid-1992 Russia was in a great depression, "with the GNP expected to
decline by over 40% during the period 1990-1993, hyperinflation is looming," and
"the budget deficit, using the IMF definitions, is equivalent to well over 10% of
the GNP." 119 It was predicted that an entire reorganization of the economic
program would be implemented for the remainder of 1992. "Several measures
were taken to liberalize foreign commercial activity"120 and after June the
government established medium term goals instead of the "shock therapy" agenda
advocated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
A law was passed on currency regulations providing more freedom in
foreign-exchange transactions, including moving capital in and out of the country.
As a result it is estimated that "almost $18 billion belonging to companies and
private citizens has left Russia [since 1989] and turned up in foreign bank
accounts."121 Price liberalization and expansion of enterprises' financial rights
has enabled foreign economic reform to move slowly ahead. "However, the key
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Reports, Vol. 1, No. 25 (19 June 1992), p. 53.
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ingredient in domestic reform - financial stabilization - is missing." 122 By the fall
of 1992 continued economic plight from an overly depreciated ruble, flight of
capital, and chronically low international reserves led to a major confrontation
between Yeltsin and the Russian Parliament in December.
Russia's VII Congress of People's Deputies met in December. It was
predicted that these meetings would be a showdown between Yeltsin and his
appointed officials, and the members of parliament. The Congress demanded the
resignation of Yeltsin's young market-oriented economist, Prime Minister Yegor
Gaidar, and after a political struggle Yeltsin conceded to the parliament. This
political battle was not an issue of central planning versus market economics. It
was a battle between "shock therapy," Yeltsin and Gaidar's vision of rapid reform,
or to proceed with economic reform in a much slower manner as most
conservatives have demanded.
Upon Gaidar's resignation Viktor Chernomyrdin was appointed to replace
Gaidar. Chernomyrdin is a close affiliate and member of the Union of
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the political organization, Civic Union. One
of his successes includes managing the only state-owned firm, the Gazprom Oil
and Gas Corporation, "not affected by the industrial slump." 123 Gaidar is not
out of the picture since Yeltsin has named him his Special Economic Advisor to




the President. This will act as a check and balance system for the economic
agenda planned for this year.
The economics confrontation was one aspect of a much larger political
power struggle. Russia's political instability has led to chaos in all other sectors
of the Russian fight for independence, economics, strategic concerns, foreign
policy, and social upheaval. Now in 1993 Yeltsin is still President, the Russian
Parliament is still composed primarily of conservatives, and all are poised for yet
another political battle beginning in April. Russia's supreme legislature, the
Congress of People's Deputies is scheduled for their next meeting to begin on 3
April. The President and Congress "have agreed to an April referendum on a
new constitution that may move Russia away from its current stalemate, in which
a new nation is being built on obsolete institutions from a now-deceased country -
and, in many cases, by obsolete politicians." 124
Three major economic programs emerged as central to the battle for political
power. One favors a return to dictatorship with fixed wages and prices, a totally
centralized economy and the elimination of free enterprise and economic ties with
the West. This position is advocated by the coalition of unreconstructed
Communists and right-wing nationalists.
The second group, allies of Yeltsin and Gaidar, favor a rapid transition to
market relations, privatization of state-owned property, a mixture of private and
124 Fred Hiatt, "For Russia, Surviving Is A Plus Sign," The Washington Post
National Weekly Edition (January 4-10, 1993), p. 18.
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collective farming, and encouragement of foreign investment and ties with the
West and the East. This group is losing popularity with most of the Russian
public as the suffering continues to mount.
The last group, primarily centrists and industrial managers labeled as
conservatives, "proclaims its belief in free-market reforms but argues for a slower
transition with more government subsidies to inefficient state-owned firms to
prevent massive unemployment." 125 As Gaidar's radical reform program has
lost popularity and may now be slowed, he succeeded "in creating new
socioeconomic realities in Russia that make a return to the past unlikely." 126
No matter what the disputes are regarding the economy Yeltsin remains the
"dominant source of power in Russian politics." 127 Yet the struggle continues
with no clear agenda for economic reforms, foreign policy, national interests or
political mandates. These factors play major roles in the international
relationships Russia has established with the other nations of the world,
including Japan. Japan remains the only major power and immediate neighbor
that Russian President Yeltsin has not visited, officially or unofficially.
Diplomatic relations are at a stalemate, as they were before the breakup of the
Soviet Union, due to the territorial question involving the Kuril Islands. Russians
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accuse and condemn the Japanese for tying political relations to economic
relations.
The Japanese believe the Russians have reneged on their promise to resolve
the territorial issue in a manner of cooperation, justice, and international law. The
Kuril Islands issue has become a major debate between the Russians themselves,
as all aspects of their domestic and foreign policies are, and as a result a
resolution with Japan is not forthcoming in the near future but trade and
economics continues to tie the two countries together.
B. RUSSIA'S GEOPOLITICAL POSITION
Russia's political, economic, and geographical position have "greatly
deteriorated" but "has untapped potential for the solution of complex problems,
geopolitical included."128 Some analysts believe that these "complex problems"
have created opportunities that could alleviate the crisis in Russia. Of significant
importance is Russia's relationship with Japan.
Russia inherited the Kuril Islands problem from the Soviet Union but is
faced with resolving the issue one way or the other. If Russia chooses to prolong
a settlement, economic expansion toward the Far Eastern countries and countries
of the Pacific Rim may be jeopardized. However, as Russia moves toward a
market-oriented society and joining the "community of nations" the outlines of
128 Sergei Rakovsky, "New Neighbors, New Problems," New Times (34.92), p. 19.
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new political, economic, and geographic, including strategic, positions are
increasingly necessary.
What is different between Russia's new geographic borders with the former
republics of the Soviet Union and the interrelationship with Japan? The
difference is that relations with Japan have not changed nor have the political and
economic realities of the past fifty years. Russia has territorial interests in the
Pacific and Arctic Oceans, and the Northern sea route. All are extremely crucial
for economic expansion into the Pacific Rim. Positive political relations with
Japan are imperative if Russia continues to seek cooperation with the prosperous
Pacific Basin countries.
When making a push toward cooperation with the Pacific nations during
1992, Moscow has intentionally left Japan out of the picture to avoid premature
negotiations on the Kuril Islands. Though economic cooperation with Japan is
highly desirable and invaluable in getting a foothold into the Pacific, Moscow
continues to debate and struggle over the Kuril Islands issue. Domestic politics
has continued to override the important objectives of Moscow pursuing an active
policy in the Pacific, particularly with Japan.
In essence, lack of consensus has created an economic and political vacuum
for Russia toward the countries of the Pacific Rim. Additionally, the political
situation in Russia is beginning to feel the upsurge in national, religious, and
ethnic conflicts with public organizations growing in support and cooperation.
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This is especially true regarding the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation
borders including the Kuril Islands.
On 9 January 1993 Yeltsin stated, "Our national interests and our geopolitical
situation make inevitable the steady presence of our country in Asia."129 He
noted that a priority of Russia's foreign policy is cooperation with Asia due to
"Russia's "Eurasian" identity" and "we seek a strong balance in our relationship
with both the East and the West." 130 Yeltsin's statement suggests that Russia
understands the importance of close cooperation and economic ties with the "East"
but due to the political struggle in Moscow Yeltsin lacks the support to make it
happen.
C THE IMF, WORLD BANK, AND THE GROUP OF SEVEN (G-7)
Russian-Japanese trade talks were held in Tokyo during the early part of
1993. It was announced at the talks that Russia's estimated external debt in
January 1993 amounted to $75.8 billion and had appropriated $16.6 billion to
service its debts in 1992. 131 On the credit side, Deputy Prime Minister
Aleksandr Shokhin "told a news conference in Moscow on 20 January that the
debts owed to the former Soviet Union [mostly insolvent client states and other
129 Quoted in Suzanne Crow, "Yeltsin Wants Partnership With Asia," RFE/RL
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third-world countries] totaled $146 billion at the official exchange rate in
1991 »i32 After this announcement many debtor nations proposed that current
exchange rates be used to assess the debt.
The good news is that trade talks between Tokyo and Moscow have been
held during 1992 and continue to be held. As early as 16 May the Japanese
Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the Russian Bank for Foreign
Trade agreed to defer the repayment of hard-currency debts owed by the former
Soviet Union. Japan agreed to grant a maximum six-month deferral of principal
repayments for medium- and long-term debt due in 1992. This was a goodwill
gesture by Japan in anticipation of Yeltsin's scheduled visit in Tokyo the
following September.
As of 1 April Russia had already received pledges of $4.5 billion in IMF and
World Bank aid from the G-7 industrialized countries of which Japan is a
member. Upon admittance to the IMF, Russia would also benefit from other
forms of G-7 consideration, including a $6-billion-ruble stabilization fund, $2.5
billion in debt referral, and $11 billion in government-to-government aid. 133
Therefore the scale of and potential for possible support was in place, with
Japan's full cooperation and no resolution of the territorial issue between Tokyo
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Along with the pledges of support Russia was warned "not to stray from its
rigorous economic regimen."134 Even as early as April Yeltsin's government was
under extreme pressure to slow the reforms but Yeltsin and Gaidar had to
continue the reforms by following the world organization's prescribed method of
transitioning to a market economy. If Russia remained in the "shock therapy"
mode the IMF said that the money "could be in the pipeline by early
summer."135 Reforms included freeing prices, eliminating subsidies, bringing the
budget deficit under control, and stopping the explosive growth in the money
supply.
The pressure from the outside world to continue the radical reforms and the
pressure to soften the reforms from the Russian parliament collided in June. The
road to "soften" the reforms began but by December had still not eased the
tremendous burdens placed on the Russian society.
In mid-May an IMF observation team reported that progress to date was
slow in such areas as reduction of the budget deficit and control over the money
supply and did not recommend approval for membership. But on 1 June Russia
was formally accepted as a member of the IMF. A quota was set at $2,876 billion
in special drawing rights, which would enable $4 billion to be borrowed in 1992
if she carried out the stabilization policy approved by the IMF.
134 Steven Mufson, "The IMF Gives Russia a New Leash on Life," The Washington




Simultaneously the world economy was in a downward spiral with
Germany, Japan, and the United States experiencing sub-par growth, rising
unemployment, lagging or declining productivity, and financial turmoil. Their
own economic difficulties created a constraint on the number of resources that
could be used to help not only the Russian Federation but many other countries
of the world. Despite their own lagging economies and Moscow's move to slow
the economic reforms the IMF, World Bank, and G-7 had made their Spring
pledges to Russia and accepted her as a member of the IMF.
But Russia failed to continue the radical reforms requested by the IMF. This
did not prevent the members of the G-7, during their summit from 6 to 8 July in
Munich, to offer a modest set of incentives: Russia received endorsement of the
IMF offer of $1 billion in credits, conditional assurances on the rest of the $24
billion package, encouraging statements on debt rescheduling, a promise of
coordinated aid on nuclear safety, pledges of the granting of most-favored-nation
(MFN) status, and the unlocking of a $500 million export cover commitment by
the United Kingdom.
Yeltsin was extended these concrete pledges of help to motivate him to
continue to implement free-market economics and democratic politics to his
country. But the Japanese delegation also achieved another coup during the
summit. Japan insisted that the G-7 officially recognize the Kuril Islands as a
territorial dispute that must be on the negotiating table and eventually resolved
to the satisfaction of both countries involved. The Russian press reported that "in
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internationalizing the dispute for the first time, Miyazawa [Japan's G-7
representative] has carried out a very cunning move to open the way to aid being
given to Russia."136
Japan's decision to internationalize the territorial dispute and Russia's
reaction are reminiscent of the vents of 1964 and 1970. In 1964 Japan raised the
territorial issue in the United Nations General Assembly several times and in 1971
the Japanese's Prime Minister delivered a plea for the return of the islands in a
speech at the U.N.'s twenty-fifth anniversary celebration. "Russians resent
involvement of third parties in Japan's irredentist claims and profess to see
ulterior motives ranging from opportunism to racism lurking behind outside
concern" and "Moscow dislikes the Kurils getting publicity in a forum." 137
Yeltsin had been invited to the July summit and, while at the summit,
pleaded for the G-7's unconditional support. On Russia's side, Yeltsin offered to
trade Russia's foreign debt for equity - mineral and mining rights, oil leases,
industrial plants, factories, warehouses, and land. He also pledged to pursue the
path of radical economic reform.
This was a difficult pledge to make since the basic framework of a modern
capitalist state did not exist and is only beginning to emerge in Russia.
136
"Comments on 1956 Declaration," LD05081715192 Moscow Russian Television
Network in Russian 1600 GMT 5 Aug 92 (FBIS-SOV-92-152, 6 August 1992, p. 16).
137 Stephan, op. cit, p. 207.
64
Much of the current wave of reform ... is not merely about giving Russia
better economic policies or a more representative political system. It is also
about creating a state within which better government and a more efficient
economy are possible. Many of the reversals have been caused not by faults
in policy design, but by the difficulty in implementing any policy in a
country that lacks some of the essential features of statehood. 138
A system for paying bills or determining interest rates did not exist. Bankruptcy
courts and bankruptcy laws did not exist. To meet the ambitious targets of the
IMF proposals were impossible without astronomically high levels of
unemployment. Russian officials had earlier in the year, during March, relaxed
draconian credit restrictions to prevent the closing of thousands of virtually
bankrupt state-owned factories.
It was evident that after six months of attempting "shock therapy" that
things were not going well. Rumors circulated in both the West and the East that
Yeltsin was contemplating "a return to both authoritarian rule and reliance on
state planning to effect a more gradual and orderly transition to economic
reform."139
Some Western analysts argued that a move such as this would have political
consequences and considered it economically self-contradictory. 140 Yeltsin was
caught in a Catch-22 situation. Damned if he continued - members of the Russian
parliament, one of the obstacles to private sector growth, would accentuate the
138
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deteriorating situation in the areas of unemployment and prices. And damned
if he didn't continue - the Western and world financial organizations would
withdraw their pledges of help.
By the end of July the major Western governments approved a loan to help
Russia pay its membership dues to the IMF. It was impossible for Russia to come
up with the hard-currency portion of its dues, amounting to about $940 million.
Without paying the dues Russia, as an IMF member, would not be able to obtain
credit allocations from the fund. Again, Japan was one of the few countries to
help Russia in yet another financial crisis.
At the same time the World Bank was preparing to give or lend Russia $600
million. Part of the money was targeted for equipment for the agriculture-
industrial, energy, and health sectors. The other half would be available to the
private sector to finance imports. The World Bank was expected to authorize an
additional $1 billion during the next fiscal year.
All the major world financial organizations, the IMF, World Bank, and the
G-7, were chipping in to do what they could. Japan and Germany were the two
most responsible countries in ensuring that Russia received continued support.
Out of the $24 billion G-7 aid package agreed to in July, Japan's, contribution was
$2.6 billion. This was in addition to the debt repayment plans for Russia
extended earlier in the year.
Russia again sought debt rescheduling in late August during a meeting
between Russian officials and G-7 representatives in Moscow. Even after the
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rescheduling already granted in 1992, "the servicing due this year was two to
three times as high as hard-currency earnings anticipated from Russia's
exports." 141 At mid-year Russia's total hard-currency debt was estimated to be
about $74 billion with principal and interest payments originally due in 1992
amounting to about $20 billion.
But no decisions were made during August concerning this new
rescheduling request. Western officials were divided over Russia's proposals for
long-term rescheduling. The United States was reportedly more receptive than
either Germany and Japan at this point. Doubts were raised about Russia's
"commitments to tough economic reform policies, questionable estimates of its
capacity to service its foreign debt, and Russia's recent offer to assume other
republic's [CIS republics] shares of the former debt of the Soviet Union." 142 A
decision was expected by the end of September, after Yeltsin's scheduled trip to
Japan during the third week in September.
By October the Russian Parliament had agreed to a renewal of subsidies for
the industrial sector, the coal miners, and the agricultural sector. This among
other items was not in compliance with the criteria, measurements, and
methodology established by the IMF. Once again, Russia was diverting from
141
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"shock therapy" to a slower economic reform program. But the IMF, World Bank,
and the G-7 were still providing as much assistance as they believed they could.
A report on Western aid to Russia, prepared by three German economic
institutes, was released on 13 October. The principal conclusion of the report was
"that Western aid to Russia must be strictly targeted and that united aid should
no longer be given."143 Since Russia had been unsuccessful in putting its
reforms into practice, primarily due to barriers at lower political levels, legal
reforms, reductions of internal economic obstacles, and safeguards for foreign
investment were nonexistent. This report was recognized as a significant study,
which was used by the major world financial institutions and Western countries
to determine their next steps. Economic assistance was not readily forthcoming
in the succeeding months by the major institutions or individual countries.
For the fourth time in 1992, Western creditor banks did grant a three-month
extension to all the former Soviet republics in repaying outstanding debt. In
December 600 banks agreed that payments on principle falling due during the
first quarter of 1993 and all payments delayed so far would be postponed. The
agreement was made in response to a Club of Paris 144 proposal in November.
At the end of 1991 the external debt of the former USSR was approximately $65.3
143
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Economic and Business Reports, Vol. 1, No. 42 (23 October 1992), p. 39.
144 The Club of Paris is a International Monetary Fund (IMF) committee that
analyzes the debts of debtor countries as one total package to provide information
to the major lender nations.
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million and had risen to $70.7 million by May 1992. Russia had assumed
responsibility for the entire debt.
The IMF released a report at the end of 1992 that predicted the following
statistics for 1993: 145
Real Gross Domestic Product Falling by 7.6%
1992 = 18.6% Decline
Export Volume Rise by 17%
Current Account Balance Dropping 20.4%
The report was critical of the relaxation of monetary policy in the region but was
enthusiastic about hardening budget constraints on enterprises. Not an optimistic
report but Russia was finally able to draw down the IMF credit of about $1 billion
by the end of December. Part of the restrictions placed on this loan was that it
must be added to Russia's hard-currency reserves and not used to finance
imports. The IMF was now dictating specific policy lines instead of general
policy guidance.
D. JAPANESE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
On 3 April Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe announced Japan's
intentions to press for reductions in Russia defense spending as a condition for
economic aid. He said that Japan could not agree to providing large-scale
financial aid as long as Russia maintained its present level of military spending.
An additional concern was the movement of Russian armory and weapons east
145
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of the Urals in compliance with the CFE Treaty, no reductions of military troops
and equipment in the Far East and, specifically, from the Kuril Islands.
In early May Yeltsin met with Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe.
During this meeting Yeltsin "suggested that the timetable for the military pullout
might be accelerated considerably and that all the troops could be out by
1994."146 The next day the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that
all 7,000 soldiers on the Islands would soon be withdrawn. 147 By 19 May, the
newly appointed Russian Minister of Defense General Pavel Grachev told a press
conference that there would be no military withdrawal from the Kurils. This was
consistent with his hard-line policy of supporting the Russians living in the
Dneister region of Moldova. Ten days later Grachev recanted his statement and
said all troops would be removed from the islands within one or two years. This
is evidence of the continuing struggle between Yeltsin and the conservatives over
both domestic and foreign policies.
An additional Japanese concern focused on the controversy over Sakhalin's
offshore oil and gas deposits and Sakhalin officials pursuing the designation of
the Sakhalin area, which includes the Kuril Islands, as a free economic zone. As
early as February, Sakhalin officials said that Sakhalin required the status of free
146 Stephen Foye, "The Struggle Over Russia's Kuril Islands Policy," RFE/RL




economic zoning to be able to negotiate the future of Sakhalin's offshore oil and
gas deposits. The Japanese believed the Kuril Islands would be next.
In 1975 Japan and the Soviet Union concluded a general agreement on
"prospecting for oil and/or gas deposits in the shelf of Sakhalin, the construction
of field facilities, and oil and gas recovery in the area concerned." 148 This was
considered a positive joint development and was one deal that could have
benefitted both countries. It was predicted that Japan could buy oil and gas
cheaper from Sakhalin than the Middle East and the USSR would be able to
expand its export industry.
During the last seventeen years two large oil and gas deposits were
discovered under this agreement. Unfortunately, the oil and gas were not cheap
to recover from the seabed. Conditions in this area are very severe especially
compared to the relative accessibility of the oil in the Middle East.
During the 1980s the projects were at a standstill. When, and if, Japanese
banks decided to give credits of a lower interest rate than usual continued
development with new technology could begin. The Japanese said they were
waiting for fuel prices to rise but Moscow believed that since Japan did not need
the deposits then and, until the Kuril Islands issue was resolved in Japan's favor,
Japan would not continue the credits.
148 Quoted in "Rivalry for Sakhalin's Shelf," New Times (7.92), p. 13.
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Four years ago the projects gained outside interest. A decision was made
to form a joint enterprise with an American company, McDermitt International.
McDermitt formed a consortium with another American company, Marathon Oil,
and the Japanese trade company Mitsui Corporation. A protocol of intentions
was signed with Moscow. However, the deal was delayed due to a new arrival
on the scene. The South Korean company Palmco had dealt directly with
Sakhalin officials, bypassing Moscow.
Last year (1992) a court battle ensued with Moscow granting the consortium
full rights on 1 April. But Sakhalin officials would not adhere to Moscow's
decision of allowing the consortium to proceed with the development project.
Sakhalin Governor Valentin Fyodorov and his officials refused to allow this to
happen. They only wanted to allow a company to proceed that could meet their
full demands - the Palmco Company. The controversy and debate in Russia are
continuing into 1993. A dangerous political game has emerged between Moscow
and Sakhalin, a game that would not have been permitted to continue before
1992. The unique political battle has great impact on the Kuril Islands issue as
well.
This has hurt not only the workers in the Sakhalin area, the people of Russia
who depend on the oil, but also the relationship with Japan. The Japanese
government and businessmen believe the Sakhalin officials, and especially the
Governor of the area, Fyodorov, of favoritism and continued exploitation of areas
that the Japanese have legal access to due to the 1975 and 1988 agreements.
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"Russian authorities are worrying about an undesired spin-off of deepening
Japanese involvement in the economy of regions to the east of the Urals." 149
This is a complete reversal of decision-making from the 1970s when Japan was
encouraged to develop strong economic ties to the Soviet Far East. No other
eligible partners were available twenty years ago. The USSR was engaged in an
ideological feud with China, "virtually ignored" 150 South Korea, and the East
Asian countries were only at the beginning of their economic development
projects.
Immediately after the announcement postponing Yeltsin's trip to Japan,
Japan said it would continue to provide the promised 2.65 billion dollars in aid
to Russia. In addition, more agreements on aid and economic assistance were
accomplished after September. This is in spite of comments from hardliners such
as Yuriy Skokov who strongly objected to Yeltsin's visit. Skokov said "Japan's
negative stance on massive economic aid to Russia" 151 was a good reason why
Yeltsin should not go to Japan. But the facts do not warrant this type of
complaint.
Japan released a White Paper on overseas aid in early October. The Paper
stressed that disbursements of Official Development Assistance (ODA) "will be
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linked more closely to recipient countries' records on military spending, arms
sales, democracy and market reforms." 152 Principles discussed in the White
Paper were tentatively made public in April 1991. By officially publishing their
accords, the Japanese government said they would be able to "highlight the need
of Tokyo to explain to the world why and how it is spending its aid money."153
This caused more arguments and debates in Moscow. Nothing new was
outlined in the White Paper but since Russia had resorted to selling arms,
cruisers, submarines, and other military equipment abroad in an effort to obtain
hard currency, Russian officials interpreted this move to mean that future
Japanese aid and assistance would not be forthcoming. Although Japan had
supplied several million-dollars worth of medical aid in the Spring of 1992
followed by $100 million package of food aid directly to the Kuril Island residents
Moscow officials remained skeptical. Also, in June bilateral talks led to an
agreement to send 2-3 Japanese engineers to work on board Russian nuclear-
powered ships operating in the Arctic Ocean. This would provide an opportunity
for the Japanese Nuclear Energy Research Institute to familiarize Japanese
specialists with Russian experience in the area.
The idea of establishing the Sakhalin Oblast and Kuril Islands a free
economic zone surfaced over a year ago. This was while Moscow's local
152 Louise de Rosario, "Flexible Principles," Far Eastern Economic Review (15




authorities were considering the possibility for the Russian Capitol. The purpose
of free economic zones was to attract foreign investment by offering investors tax
incentives, convenient geographical locations, and skilled but cheap local labor.
Russian officials slowly opened areas as free economic zones during the course
of the year.
By November 1992 thirteen such zones had been established. The Sakhalin
region but not the Kuril Islands was one of the original thirteen. The Japanese
were vehemently opposed to the idea that the Kuril Islands be opened for this
would jeopardize the possibility of the return of the four southern Islands to
Japan. This is similar to the Israelis building settlements as quickly as possible
in the occupied territories to use later as a basis for staying instead of giving up
the occupied lands.
But economic discussions continued. On 24 November it was announced
that Japanese and Russian officials began talks on increasing Russian uranium
sales to Japan. Joint training projects to upgrade the safety of Russian nuclear
reactors and other areas of technical cooperation were also part of the talks. In
addition, Japan has offered to help in converting defense industries located in the
Russian Far East to electronics industries that could serve as peacetime industries
such as Japanese Television manufacturers. 154
154 Stated by Dr. Clay Moltz in a presentation to NPS NSA students on 15
October 1992. Dr. Moltz argued that "the disintegration of the Soviet Union really
made the return of the Islands much less likely from the Russian perspective than
much more likely. For Russian conservatives the Kuril Islands had really become
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Another Russo-Japanese project was announced in January 1993. Japan has
agreed to assist with Russia's nuclear waste disposal. Radioactive waste (but not
fissile materials) from dismantled nuclear warheads will be disposed of with
Japan's aid. Due to Russia's lack of funds and technology Japan has agreed to
provide most of the aid and technology necessary for this project.
At the same time Japan was reported as reluctant to assist Ukraine and
Germany with the same type of project. This is just one more example of Japan
offering aid and assistance to Russia even though the Kuril Islands remain in the
hands of the Russians. Humanitarian and economic issues are always tied to
political ones even issues that are not resolved but bargaining chips must be
extended and have been by both countries.
E. SUMMARY
On 29 January 1993, speaking before the.Indian parliament during a visit,
Yeltsin said, "Our national interests and our geopolitical situation make inevitable
the steady presence of our country in Asia."155 He said that Asia is a priority
a symbol. There was really a last stand to halt the disintegration of what had
once been a mighty, great power." I agree with Dr. Moltz's suggestion as a short-
term hypothesis but not as the long-term solution. As long as the parliament
consists of hard-liners from the Communist regime the issue will remain stagnant.
But if the elections scheduled for 1996 do occur the odds are that the parliament
will have new faces, specifically more moderates and democrats, who want the
market economy and capitalist policies to continue to further enhance their
successes and bank accounts.
155 Crow, op. cit, p. 2.
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in Russian foreign policy owing to Russia's "Eurasian" identity. Yeltsin made it
clear that ties to both the West and the East were essential and that Russia seeks
"a strong balance in our relationship with both the East and the West." 156
Fyodorov was elected by the residents of the Sakhalin Oblast on a platform
of economic reform and development. An economist from Moscow, he has
achieved some successes157 in the area but has refused to discuss the Kuril
Islands territorial dispute. To him there is no issue - all of the Kuril Islands are
and will remain part of Russia. "The islands are ours and will remain ours!"158
He blames those in Moscow who want to discuss and settle the issue with Japan
as "capitalists and traitors."159 This is the same argument the Soviets used from
the early 1960s until the late 1980s.
Residents of the area are divided. Half choose to allow Japan to regain
ownership of the South Kuril Islands, proceed with economic development in the
entire Russian Far East, and for Tokyo and Moscow to sign a peace treaty. They
believe this will provide the economic stimulus and employment that are
desperately needed in the area.
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The other half is on Fyodorov's side. Strong nationalist and patriotic
feelings have emerged during the last year. Many Russians believe that Moscow
is just giving away Russian lands. Those who believe in this position are usually
the older generation who have always received their jobs, stipends, and subsidies
from the government . . . and still fear the imperialists and capitalists.
Contrary to the Soviet and Russian conservative-nationalist belief that Japan
desperately needs access to the natural resources of the Russian Far East and
Siberia, Japan "isn't dependent on Russian natural gas and oil." 160 For Japan the
issue of the islands is not solely dependent on economics. Traditional, political,
and social interests are equally important in their decision to fight this battle since
1945.
Japan has used the economic-political link as a way to keep the Russians at
the negotiating table instead of withdrawing from discussions completely.
"Overall political and strategic considerations dominate Japan's economic
relations" 161 with the Russian Federation as they did with the Soviet Union.
One thing the Japanese want to avoid completely is having the Russians return
to the early Soviet policy of the islands as a non-issue. On the positive side, since
the Gorbachev years and during 1992 Japan has consistently supported Russia's
160 Mlechin, op. cit, p. 12.
161 Wolf Mendl, "Stuck in a Mould: The Relationship Between Japan and the
Soviet Union," in Kathleen Newland, ed., The International Relations of Tapan
(London: MacMillan Academic and Professionals Ltd, 1990), p. 192.
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moves toward democratization, liberalization and transformation to a market
economy.
Russian authorities have continued to link economics and political decision-
making with the islands when dealing with Tokyo. But the leaders in Moscow
are well aware of their many crises, especially in the economic arena.
[The] historical kinship between the two nations as late modernizers is one
reason why Russia is beginning to turn enormous attention to Japan.
Having rejected socialism and the Soviet system, Russians now find Japan's
market economy and the remarkable economic growth it achieved attractive.
In their efforts to build a new and workable system out of the ruins of the
old, Russians are looking to Japan for clues. 162
And as the evidence suggests the Russians continue to look toward Japan for
economic aid and assistance to help them transition to a market economy,
capitalist policies, and to become an accepted member of the community of
nations.
The Kuril Islands territorial dispute is no closer to being resolved but it is
still on the negotiating table. This is a sign for the continued positive and
cooperative relations between the two countries. An immediate settlement is not
likely as were the overly enthusiastic expectations of Russia's transition to
democracy. With continued support, encouragement, and assistance a successful
transition and a resolution to the dispute may occur within the next several
decades. Economic incompatibility is still an obstacle to overcome if economic
162 Saito Minoru, "Japanese and the Russian Struggle Toward a New System,"
Tapan Quarterly, Vol. XXXIX No. 2 (April-June 1992), p. 182.
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relations are to grow between the two countries. It is apparent that the Russian
Federation still needs the cooperation and assistance from Japan much more than
Japan needs help from the former Soviet Union.
Windows of opportunity have opened for continued negotiations and
continue to be opened and shut by one country or the other. Until the Russian
Federation government achieves an agreement on the direction of their foreign
policy, what their national interests are, and on an economic program the internal
struggles and debates on the direction the entire country should move, backward
or forward, will receive the most attention.
80
V. STRATEGIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS
A. OVERVIEW
As part of the post-Soviet policies announced by Russian Federation officials
in January 1992, the Asian-Pacific region would also receive a reassessment of
policies with newly identified interests. As the legal successor to the USSR all
treaties and agreements concluded with the Asian-Pacific countries would be
fulfilled. Reassessments were undertaken with "certain positive results" but
"failed to overcome much of what was in the way of the policy." 163 As
Aleksandr Losyukov, Head of the Asian-Pacific Department of the Russian
Foreign Ministry said:
First of all the obsessive ideological orientation of the policy [one of the
factors to overcome]. That factor made it difficult to realize the principles
of new thinking the leaders of the former "Union themselves proclaimed.
This obstacle has been removed. We feel that our foreign policy should be
free of ideological elements. . . . The present policy is aimed at developing
cooperation with its former adversaries while preserving normal relations
with the countries it called and calls its friends. . . . Russia gives priority
to the improvement of relations with its immediate neighbors and also
countries located not far from its borders. A stable, peaceful situation along
the perimeters of our borders is a normal condition for economic progress
within our country, for our trade with surrounding nations and for our
integration into the economy of the Asian-Pacific region. Only progress
along this road will ensure our country a worthy place in the region. We
have given up the former policy of the military build-up in the Pacific-Basin
in favor of the other, peaceful goals. We want to develop political
163
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cooperation and trade with all Asian-Pacific countries, both with immediate
neighbors, and with those that are far away from us geographically. 164
This is a typical diplomatic statement by a foreign ministry official. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was careful to avoid confrontation with the Ministry
of Defense. Kozyrev said, "We will have to learn to take account not just of
Russia's military-political interests but, above all, of its economic interests."165
He was interested in attracting business investments into the country, especially
in the Far East. He insisted that the "investments can only help the state take the
worthy place in world society that history has decreed for Russia."166 The time
had come, Kozyrev believed, to apply the idea of closing military facilities instead
of the Soviet concept of a closed society and closed regions.
During a meeting with foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries Kozyrev
cited several security ventures167 that should be accomplished for the Asian-
Pacific region:
(1) An introduction of restrictions on the scale of naval exercises in the area
and a renouncement of naval exercises in international waters and zones of
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(2) A multilateral dialogue to start immediately for the creation of a system
for crisis settlement in the Asiatic Pacific Ocean region. This was aimed at
preventing an increase in military tension.
(3) An agreement should be reached on the formation of international naval
forces to guarantee the freedom of navigation for the purposes of trade.
Kozyrev also expressed Moscow's "readiness to develop military and technical
cooperation with the ASEAN states, aimed at maintaining their security at a level
of reasonable sufficiency." 168 The term "reasonable sufficiency" has been the
foundation of Soviet military policy for the past decade.
Kozyrev concluded his remarks with the following statement:
Our aspiration and firm determination to bring our military parameters into
conformity with the criteria of reasonable sufficiency does not mean that we
are withdrawing from the region and that we are completely disintegrating.
So, we must also find a worthy place for our naval presence. 169
What was the view of the Ministry of Defense and senior military leaders?
The Soviet Far East military buildup started during the mid- to late 1970s to the
consternation of the Japanese and officials of other bordering countries. The
Soviet Army always took priority in spending and policy-making. Post-Soviet
views were not welcomed by many in the military establishment.
The American-Japanese security alliance has concerned the Soviet (now
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alliance "substantially complicates the entire military-political situation in the
region and is the principal brake in the path of accomplishing Asiatic security
tasks."170 Only through multilateral disarmament agreements would stability
and cooperation occur throughout the region.
The security debate continued through the year (1992) as did the political,
economic, and social debates. During his trip to South Korea in November,
Yeltsin outlined his proposed security policy for the Asian-Pacific area. The
proposal included establishing a multinational security consultative body in Asia
but did not specify which countries should be included. He also suggested Asian
nations launch working-level councils to address topics such as arms reduction
and the specifics regarding the multinational group. Yeltsin also offered to
reduce strategic and other weapons deployed in Asia.
Miyazawa's reaction to these proposals was one of interest and he expressed
a desire to learn more of the details. Yeltsin's plan was very similar to the one
outlined by Miyazawa a month earlier when he "proposed that the United States
and other Asia-Pacific nations consider a framework to address regional security
issues." 171
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In May the Japanese government endorsed a plan to establish cooperation
between the Japanese and Russian Defense Ministries. This was an
unprecedented plan for both countries. The cooperation between the two
countries would help to carry out confidence-building measures, the first of which
focused on incidents at sea. The first-ever bilateral policy planning meeting was
conducted in June. During the two-day meeting in Moscow discussions included
addressing the military situation in the Far East Asian region and security
conditions following the end of the Cold War.
The Kuril Islands debate was one concern of the Russian military leaders.
They favored the Asiatic-Pacific region security issues addressed by Yeltsin but
many did not agree with their Russian colleagues on the level of importance
applied to the strategic and security interests related to the Kurils.
B. THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL DISPUTE
The year began with a battle between Yeltsin and Russian military leaders
over whether the Russian troops will be removed from the Kurils and when the
move would begin. By March some troops had been transferred from the Islands
but the Japanese said they did not believe any significant withdrawal had begun.
They were reacting to Kozyrev's February announcement that the 1991 plan on
a 30 percent reduction in the troop level on the Kurils had been carried out.
According to the Russians 7,000 troops were deployed in the South Kuril
Islands not counting the border guards. The Japanese estimated 10,000 troops
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remained and believed "partial reductions in troops on the South Kurils are
nonsensical, and that all troops must withdraw from the islands." 172
In April, Commonwealth Unified Army Forces (UAF) Head, Major General
Zakomin said he favored the 30 percent reduction of forces and that the troop
withdrawal is already underway. By May, a Foreign Ministry official announced
that all 7,000 troops will be withdrawn soon not including the border guards.
This was suggested to be a move to reduce the surplus military presence in
Russia instead of related to the territorial demarcation issue.
Yeltsin made an unlikely move in May by appointing Russian hard-liner
Pavel Grachev as the Ministry of Defense. One of Grachev's first speeches
included the prospect of "stationing of army subunits in the South Kurils and that
the troops will not be withdrawn" from the islands. 173 The newly appointed
commander of the Pacific Frontier District, Major General Bladimir Boruchenko
emphasized that "the Kurils will continue to belong to Russia. Otherwise historic
justice will be abused, and a dangerous precedent will be created for other
territorial claims."174
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Both statements contradicted Yeltsin's earlier comments regarding troop
withdrawal within two or three years and implementation of the five-stage plan
(which item three states all troops will be withdrawn) of returning the islands to
Japan. Several days later Grachev said "that his remarks on withdrawing the
troops had been misinterpreted, but he provided no further details on his
views."175
On 21 June Marshal Shaposhnikov, Supreme Commander of the CIS forces,
said Russian troops could not be withdrawn from the Kuril Islands over the next
two years, as Yeltsin had promised in May. He reportedly said that "Russia had
not become "so weak or puny" that it should start "trading [Russian] land for
some kind of temporary successes." 176 In addition he believed there was a
strong feeling among the Russian people and the military against returning the
islands and warned "the issue could provoke a new cold war between the two
countries."177 In a recorded statement he allegedly said:
What statements we have heard from the Japanese! They have said, for
example: We will lock up the Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet in the Sea of
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Okhotsk! As long as such talk is heard from Japan, we will come to no
understanding whatsoever on any issue.178
The contradictory policy statements continued throughout the summer
between the Russian military commanders and Yeltsin and his foreign ministry
officials. Yeltsin announced at mid-August that the troops would be withdrawn
by the middle of 1995 and planned to sign an agreement with Japan to that effect
during his September visit to Tokyo. The next day presumably the Russian
General Staff issued an order to reinforce the military units stationed on the
islands. This was not confirmed nor did this report receive any further press
coverage.
Japan's Kvodo news service reported on 30 September that the Russian
government had reaffirmed its commitment to withdraw all Russian troops from
the disputed Kuril Islands. Kvodo also reported that Grachev had announced
that the withdrawal would start after a decision by the politicians. Yeltsin had
earlier outlined his plan to have all the troops withdrawn by mid-1995 citing
political, economic and military circumstances as the factors preventing an
immediate withdrawal. Troops returning from Eastern Europe were already
facing unemployment and a lack of housing. Morale within the Russian army
was at an all time low by mid-year.
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Shaposhnikov said during an interview on 17 October that Russia "might
reconsider its earlier pledge to withdraw all its troops" since a "withdrawal would
be "meaningless"." 179 Russia would only have to reinforce the area with more
border guards if the area were demilitarized. He suggested that "the way could
be opened for a settlement of the island issue if Japan were to provide more
economic assistance to Russia and if the new generation Russian politicians came
to understand that Japan was not an enemy."180 This was a much softer
approach than his comments expressed five months earlier and he did not refer
to any Japanese comments of wanting "to lock up the Soviet Union's Pacific
Fleet."
C. RUSSIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP
On 4 August 1992, LTC James F. Holcomb, SHAPE Central and East
European Defense Studies, released an analysis of Russian military doctrine that
included a short case study of the Kuril Islands. 181 In his assessment, Holcomb
summarized five reasons 182 why the Russian military commanders believe a
surrender of the Kurils is unacceptable:
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1. It violates the principles of inviolability of post-war borders.
2. It will give the Japanese a pretext for further, much larger claims.
3. It would cause a chain reaction among other states with territorial claims
against Russia, notably China.
4. The economic importance of the Kurils to Russia.
5. It would allow foreign intelligence operations, disrupt the unified radar
net across East Russia, reduce the survivability of the anti-invasion forces,
and prohibit sea and air communications with Kamchatka if threatened.
The report served as a view to the "current General Staff perceptions of the threat
to the homeland and as an example of the practical application of a particular
world view." 183
Out of the five reasons cited by Holcomb only the last one was emphasized
by the military representatives at the closed parliamentary hearings on the Kuril
Islands that were held in July 1992. The first three were addressed minutely by
other parliament and government officials. The economic issues were of greater
importance than the other discussions except the legality and justice of the entire
territorial demarcation issue.
At the hearings Yu.A. Kaysin, Rear Admiral of the Russian Federation Navy,
highlighted the strategic importance of the islands as an assurance of the
country's defense capability in the Far East. He said:
These strait zones afford us an opportunity to monitor the operations of the




part of the Kuril Islands would lead to disruptions of the military
infrastructure and the integrity of the unified strategic defenses in the Far
East, and would sharply lower the ability of our strategic forces to stand up
in combat. 184
The admiral was concerned about the continuing American presence in the
area and the Japanese-American exercises that "have not diminished in the least
in the past two years but, on the contrary, have been increasing."185 Also of
concern is the fact that the Kuril Islands (both Northern and Southern) provide
the only thoroughfare into the Pacific region during the winter.
After a question from the floor about what extent the Russian Pacific forces
are prepared in terms of combat readiness to confront the American Navy, Kaysin
replied:
I know what you are getting at. The fact that our Pacific Fleet is weaker
than the American's is no secret, and we have never concealed it. But
proceeding from the defensive strategy that our country has adopted, we are
maintaining that fleet in the quantity capable of providing for the defense
of our borders, not conducting any offensive operations. 186
The next questioner asked, "What, do you have information that Japan is
intending attacking our state?" Kaysin said, "No, I do not have such information.
I do not have information that America is about to attack us [either]."187 One
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official summed up the discussion by saying that the American forces were being
cut back rapidly and that Japan, as an independent military force, was not capable
of posing a threat to Russia at all.
V. P. Zalomin, General Staff of the Defense Ministry of Russia, employed a
different view. Zalomin focused on a three-part plan regarding the area. First,
a reduction in Russian, Japanese, and American forces should occur as part of a
joint effort. Second, The idea of being "locked in" during the winter months must
be evaluated and resolved so that troops would not be put in the position of not
being able to accomplish their missions. Third, the people who lived on the
Kurils must be rendered effective economic assistance and solutions must be
adopted in order that people might live there in a civilized manner.
The hearings centered on the security interests and the 'legitimate' interests
of the military staff regarding a revision of status of the Kuril Islands or part of
them. The consensus was to address all the issues in one package as part of the
negotiation process. Even within the military assessments of the true significance
of the four disputed islands varied. Some military leaders believed it was an
issue to address politically as part of a national and regional security plan in the
interests of the state.
All agreed that the United States "needs to be confronted with the question
of the limitation and termination even of antisubmarine activity on its part in
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peacetime in the area of the Sea of Okhotsk and the adjacent zone." 188 It was
believed that both Japan and the U.S. must consider the legitimate security
interests of Russia when addressing the Kuril Islands issue. The hearings suggest
that the military was included as part of the internal and external policy process
not as the sole decision-maker.
After the hearing the Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta published a document
that the newspaper claimed had been distributed to the Russian parliament by the
General Staff on 28 July. The document:
Urged in the strongest terms that no concessions be made to Tokyo on the
islands, claiming that the presence of Russian forces on the islands was the
main factor deterring Japan from forcefully pursuing territorial pretensions
and that the southernmost island served as the main Japanese-US
springboard for a potential attack on the Russian mainland. They stated
their belief that concessions could not only lead to other countries to make
further territorial claims [which was already happening anyway] on Russia
but could also undermine support for the government throughout the region
and lead ultimately to the formation of a secessionist republic on Russia's
far eastern territory.
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This document received very little press at the time and no comments in the press
were found for the period following 28 July. It is with suspicion that the
document is reported to have even existed.
The Pacific Fleet commander told Kyodo on 1 August "that reductions in
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Kuril Islands." 190 He could not understand why Japan would not study
disarmament, instead "continuing a qualitative buildup of its fleets despite
substantial cuts in the Russian Pacific Fleet." 191 This was a very different
approach then the one he outlined during the parliamentary hearings just two
weeks earlier.
By the fall of 1992 the Russian military leadership advocated that the Kuril
Islands issue was a political decision and the Russian military would act
according to whatever political decision was made. They insisted that the
strategic and security analyses that they provided to the political leaders were
part of their job based on the objective military and geopolitical realities based on
a worst case scenario. Military leaders are expected to outline worst case
scenarios and responses to such scenarios.
In the Kurils, the primary factor of strategic and security integrity was to
ensure the stability of the military infrastructure network throughout the Far East
including the airspace surveillance system. In addition, easy and quick access to
the Pacific during the winter can only be achieved through the Kuril Islands. The
arguments of the Russian military leadership were based, they believed, on
strictly coastal defense instead of power projection.
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As is typical for military planners and leaders, in order to spend more
money on high technology weapons and on defense, in general, justifications
must be made to influence the votes in their favor. The Russian military
leadership is now experiencing this new environment.
D. SUMMARY
The Russian military leadership is learning to adjust to a post-Cold War
world. Morale, readiness, and prestige have dramatically decreased during the
past year. By presenting their viewpoints for not returning the islands to Japan
they soon realized their argument was weak regarding concerns over what Japan
or the Americans may do militarily. They soon focused on strictly strategic
guidelines such as the Far East surveillance infrastructure network and the access
route to the Pacific Ocean. These arguments were much better received and
analyzed by the government policy-makers. .
The military leadership was careful to point out that the people must decide
the island's outcome. In this respect they played to the nationalist feelings that
were running rampant in Russia during 1992. Understandably, most of the
military leadership has supported statements and actions associated with the
extreme Russian nationalists and hard-line conservatives. On the other hand, they
advocate that they will abide by whatever political decision is made.
In a closed session on 5 December, the Congress of People's Deputies heard
a report from the Minister of Defense Grachev. Grachev called for "a moratorium
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on the army's involvement in politics for the sake of stabilization and Russia's
revival. The army has been and will be on the side of the people, law, and the
constitution. The army serves the fatherland, it is an instrument and attribute of
the state, and that says everything."192
His statement can be interpreted in several ways. First, the army really will
abide by all political decisions no matter who is in power or the army will decide
when they will abide by the politician's decisions depending on the policy
dictated. Regarding the Kuril Islands, a decision has not been made yet nor is
one likely in the future. For the time being the military leadership may be
softening toward the prospect of at least negotiating an agreement to the
satisfaction of both countries.
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VI. THE PEOPLE AND SOCIAL INTERESTS
A. OVERVIEW
After the breakup of the Soviet Union the media was set into a new
direction. "Free media" is still attempting to emerge in a post-communist Russia.
Though the Russian press is working hard to overcome the old obstacles, more
education and training are required. Old habits are dying hard and "a more
dangerous type of excess needs curbing if the profession is to be taken seriously
and make its contribution to public life." 193 According to Brown, opinion over
fact in the media is the excess. But "there are cases of excellence and progress .
. . most notably in Russia." 194
During perestroika the Soviet press "had an unprecedented impact on the
population." 195 By 1991 interest and, more important, trust in the media started
to decrease which was the opposite of the public's reaction during the late 1980s.
Biases toward commentaries, opinionated news coverage, and a tendency toward
sensationalism were acceptable before 1991. However, by the early 1990s, the
"openness in the media was no longer a novelty and politics had moved on from
193
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words to deeds"196 which helped to push the media into a declining role in
society. The Russian media is still struggling to find its role in society and "the
government has yet to learn how to live with true freedom of the press." 197
Public opinion polls are not new to the Russian people. Before Gorbachev's
time in power, results were taken with a grain of salt since the Communists
controlled what information was printed. During perestroika barriers were
broken down but few people were trained in the science and accuracy of
conducting public opinion polls. In 1992 the problem seems to still exist.
During an interview in April 1992, the head of the UR (Russian) Service for
the Study of Public Opinion said, due to the "widespread demand for information
... a vast number of services, centers, and associations which conduct so-called
sociological polls"198 has increased dramatically and do more harm than good.
Polls are usually restricted to the people of Moscow. Few rural residents can be
contacted since they do not have telephones and many people work not only
during the day but during the night. Questions asked are often misleading, are
not objective, and are incomplete. Interpretation of the results are usually
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population, such as the residents of the Kuril Islands, are usually much more
accurate than widespread polls.
These are important points to keep in mind when discussing the opinions
of the Russian people and, specifically, the residents of the Kuril Islands.
Misinformation due to a lack of professionalism, in essence a lack of training, may
lead not only the public but also the government in directions which do not
reflect the entire society. In the long term "the truth will be crystallized,
professionalism will prevail objectively, and all the rubbish, all the extraneous
material, will be sifted out"199 as media polling organizations, and the Russian
people gain more knowledge and experience of a post-communist society.
B. THE KURIL ISLANDS
"The Far East. These words evoke in Soviet citizens twin associations -
distance and romance."200 Distance because the islands are so remote from the
main population centers of the Russian Federation and romance because the
islands are known for their exotic beauty. The Kurils are mostly volcanic
outcrops, as a part of the Pacific's "rim of fire," that are subject to earthquakes,
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humidity in the Kurils usually "assume the form of thick fogs that blanket the
islands for weeks, making navigation treacherous."201
Fishing is a big business on the islands though only 21 percent of the
population is "directly connected to the fishing industry."202 Oilers make up the
administrative and managerial positions or are the families of servicemen. The
Pacific and adjacent seas supply 40 percent of the country's fish, such as herring,
cod, flounder, halibut, mackerel, and mollusks. Only 2 percent of the catch
remains on the islands. Nearly 100 percent of the country's supply of crab and
salmon comes from the Kuril waters. Kelp plantations are plentiful in this area
also. As part of a bilateral agreement, Japanese fishermen harvest kelp in the
Russian waters around the southern Kurils.
The Kuril Islands are nesting areas for hundreds of types of migratory birds.
"Protection of migratory birds such as the Siberian crane has been coordinated
between the Soviet Union and Japan by a special government convention
concluded in 1973."203
The original inhabitants of the Kuril Islands, the Ainu, no longer reside on
the Islands.204 Of the approximately 22,000 Ainu in the world, most live in
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northern Japan and on the island of Hokkaido. The islands' 1983 population,
including Sakhalin Island, was 679,000. The Kuril population now numbers
25,000-30,000 people and most of the population are Russians who moved there
during the Communist years primarily after World War II. People were offered
larger salaries to move east and settle the Siberian and Far East areas. Migration
to the Kurils after the 1945 Soviet occupation of the islands was encouraged by
the Soviet officials once Stalin had deported 17,000 Japanese who were living on
the islands at the end of the war. The Habomais Islands now have no inhabitants
except a few guard posts.
C THE ISLANDS' RESIDENTS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE
As early as January 1992, the Kuril government urged the United Nations
to take the islands under its aegis. They wanted the UN to send a commission
of experts to the southern Kurils to work out development plans. The
parliamentarians also suggested turning the islands into an international park and
a center of ecological tourism. This was proposed as a way to overcome the
obstacle between Russian-Japanese relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
skeptical of these plans as an effective method of settling the territorial dispute
and establishing cooperative relations with the Japanese. It was also announced
warns that "Kuril prehistory is shrouded in uncertainty. No one has been able to
date man's first appearance on the islands or identify the earliest inhabitants.
Contrasting hypotheses have vied for attention, but none have gained universal
acceptance. Consequently, much of what is being said about the subject should
be regarded as informed speculation."
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at this time that Yeltsin was scheduled to visit Japan sometime during the coming
summer.
A poll released on 18 January showed 71 percent of the Russians questioned
who were not Kuril residents, said that Russia should not return to Japan the four
Kuril Islands annexed to the USSR in 1945.205 The people in favor of returning
the islands included younger people, as well as the most educated people. The
main opponents included residents of the Volga-Vyatsk region and the Far East.
The problem with this poll is that the question is misleading. "Should the
four Kurile Islands annexed to the USSR in 1945 be returned to Japan?" This
implies that Russians know the full story of the islands. This is improbable since
the Communists were very careful in deciding what Soviet citizens were allowed
to have knowledge of. "There is no competent public opinion in Russia today on
the problem of the "northern territories," since the public at large is only
superficially familiar with the heart of the matter."206
By the end of January the Kuril Islanders were nervous about the territorial
issue. The Kurils were already a subject of heated discussions and debates by the
public and the politicians. Though exchanges of delegations with the Japanese,
Japanese humanitarian aid was being provided, and numerous joint enterprises
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(with Japanese capital) were a regular occurrence, the residents were unsure of
the outcome of the territorial discussions.
It did not help when Russian television announced on 1 April that the Kuril
Islands had been transferred to Japan. Supposedly the islands' residents were
gripped with "panic and confusion."207 This April Fool's Day "joke" was taken
seriously by a "population who has minimal information on the course of
Russian-Japanese negotiations."208
After seven months of debate and many articles in the press a survey of the
Kuril residents was broadcast on a local Moscow television station. The survey
showed that 33 percent opposed returning the islands to Japan, 33 percent
supported returning the islands, and the last one-third were undecided.209 This
was the first released poll of the residents themselves and was very different
from the poll of the public at large conducted in January. The Governor of the
Sakhalin Oblast, Fyodorov, said that the one-third who favored the idea "only do
so because they believe they would have a better standard of living if
207
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incorporated into Japanese territory."210 He said this without the benefit of any
poU.
Another poll of 515 responding residents of the islands of Iturup, Shikotan
and Kunashir was released before the television broadcast. A majority of the
respondents supported Yeltsin and the government in their resolution of the
territorial dispute "with the condition that the governments of the two countries -
Russia and Japan - offer guarantees of their social protection."211 The residents
did not indicate what type of resolution should occur but did indicate support for
Yeltsin to negotiate a resolution and sign a peace treaty.
During closed parliamentary hearings on the Kurils, the Deputy Foreign
Minister released results of a poll that, in his opinion, was "the sole scientific
public opinion poll - that is known to me."212 Seventy-seven regions and
localities were polled. More than half of the regions were located in the Far East.
According to the data 4.6 percent of the respondents said that there was no
territorial problem regarding the Kurils. Close to 84 percent believed that an
improvement in relations with Japan was essential for Russia and 51 percent were
aware that relations between the two countries were being impeded by the
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absence of a peace treaty and the problem of territorial demarcation. The
majority, 61 percent, were convinced that if the problem is settled relations with
Japan would improve and 67 percent believed that relations would deteriorate if
the issue was not resolved.
The results of this poll display a high level of awareness of a foreign policy
and domestic problem. It also suggests many people living in the Far East
believe Japan to be an important country to have normal relations with. On a
larger scale dealing with foreign policy, a poll released in July, 11 percent of the
respondents answered that Japan should be a main concern in establishing
relations with. 213 Countries receiving a higher percentage are - CIS countries,
83%; United States, 44%; Germany, 23%; Other West European countries, 21%.
The rest of the results were - Near East countries, 5% and China, 4%.
The most in-depth poll of the public at large was released after Yeltsin's trip
to Japan in September was "postponed." This poll was released on 6 November
1992 but included results of two earlier polls. The November 1991 poll included
1,917 Russians while the August 1992 one included 1,917 people. Results from
the November 1991 and August 1992 polls are outlined below: 214
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**Would you agree to transfer the Kuril Islands to Japan?
(percentage of total number of those polled)





**Why should the Kuril Islands be transferred to Japan? (8/92)
(percentage of those who agree to transfer the islands)
These are ancestral Japanese lands 33
In order to receive financial aid from Japan 21
In order to sign a peace treaty 17
Residents of islands wish to live in Japan 13
Japan lacks living space 9
In keeping with international treaties 8
**Why should the Kuril islands not be transferred to Japan?
(percentage of those who do not agree to transfer the islands)
Our fellow citizens live there 21
These are ancestral Russian lands 20
The prestige of Russia will suffer 18
Proceeding from the principle of the
inviolability of borders 16
In keeping with international treaties 11
In view of our economic interests 10
Proceeding from our strategic interests 9
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By mid-year several organizations had formed specifically recognizing the
Kuril Islands issue as their main focus. The Russian Committee for Protection of
the Kurils held a rally on 10 September in Moscow. Their rally was a victory
campaign in recognition of the cancellation of Yeltsin's trip to Japan.
The rally's leader called on the participants to "continue their struggle for
civil rights and preservation of the territorial integrity of the USSR."215 He also
"expressed hope that Japanese will show understanding to the sentiments of the
Russian people defending their islands and retain friendly relations with
them."216 Evidently, by the desire for "territorial integrity of the USSR/'
participants of this Committee and rally fall into the nationalist camp and wish
to 'go back to the way it was' but proceed with friendly relations with Japan.
Cossacks entered the picture at the request of Sakhalin Governor Fyodorov.
He stated in June that:
We have currently begun something interesting in the Kurils: we are
moving Cossacks into the southern islands. And we want everyone to know
that this is Russian land - from this day forth and forever. These people
will simply not give that land back to anyone. . . . The society has perceived
morbidly the appearance of Cossacks in the Kurils. But I am convinced, and
I repeat once again, that in this situation it is the Cossacks - the primordial
tillers of the land and guardians of the Russian borders -who are capable
guaranteeing the stability in this region.217
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Where the millions of rubles were coming from for the Cossacks to move to and
develop the islands, no one knew, not even Fyodorov.
Five weeks later a radio broadcast said that the Cossacks had obtained
10,000 Khabarovsk and Maritime Kray resident (Far East areas but not residents
of the Kurils) signatures in support of the Kuril and Sakhalin residents' demands.
Signatures "included not only Cossacks but also post workers, sailors,
shipwrights, fishermen, and peasantry and intelligentsia representatives."218 The
petition was to be taken to the Russian government in Moscow by the Cossack
delegation.
One group unhappy about Fyodorov' s idea of settling Cossacks on the
islands are the people living on the island of Kunashir. They collected more than
1,600 signatures on a petition that was eventually sent to Yeltsin demanding a
halt to any settling of Cossacks in the Kurils. This from the residents of the
Kurils themselves.
D. KURIL ISLANDERS AND THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT
At the same time that Fyodorov was drumming up support for his cause of
blocking the Russian government from returning any islands, the Russian media
announced that the Japanese government "has already worked out plans for
settling these problems (faced by the Kuril residents for whom the islands have
218
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become home) once the islands are returned."219 Japan was "studying the
possibility of offering special status to the residents of the southern Kurils to
guarantee their permanent residence and housing."220 They did not plan to
expel the islands' residents as Stalin had expelled the 17,000 Japanese residents
after WWII.
Immediately after the radio broadcast a "Resolution of Inaugural Congress
of the Russian National Assembly on the Southern Kuriles" was released. The
resolution protested the "mass information media and Russian radio and
television, having been seized by the radical-perestroika forces, [that] are waging
a massive pro-Japanese [sometimes referred to as "Japanophilia"] political
campaign among the populace."221
The government resolution supported Fyodorov in claiming that the
southern Kurils are an inseparable part of the Russian territory. Additionally, the
resolution called for the Russian government to "take concrete steps to supply the
populace of the Kuriles with food and fuel, and to put into operation the only
airport on the Southern Kuriles in the settlement of Mendeleevo."222 Rumors
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began circulating that many Islanders were ready to accept any Japanese
compensations that were offered to them to leave the islands.
The National Assembly also called upon all Russians to support a resolution
of the Sakhalin government officials who wanted to observe "Southern Kuriles
Day" throughout Russia on 6 June 1992. This in response to the Japanese
observation of Northern Territories Day celebrated on 7 February during the past
twenty years. The resolution also declared, "No confidence in President Yeltsin,
who has not carried out his promises, which he made to the voters on the
problems of the Southern Kuriles, and consider him incapable of defending the
national interests of Russia!"223 This happened only two months after
Gorbachev's resignation but after the Kuril Islands' residents have suffered a very
hard life-style for many years, virtually forgotten by the Soviet government.
During an interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Kunadze in August he
said:
I was in the Kurils and am able to judge: During these 47 years that we
have been on the islands no one raised a finger to bring these islands up to
at least some kind of decent economic level. There are no roads there, none.
The islands are, if you will, our national disgrace.224
The villages and towns often remain without electricity, the price of goods
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continually interrupted which is so important in delivering supplies with the
airport closed down. To add fuel to the fire, unemployment has skyrocketed.
Regardless, the National Assembly thought it appropriate to call for a celebration
day that was originally called the Day for Protection of the South Kurils.
By May a government official, People's Deputy of Russia Aleksey Surkov,
in favor of returning the islands to Japan commented:
Perhaps when they looked into the essential nature of the problem, the
Kuril Islanders themselves, understanding the true intentions of the latter-
day keepers of the national pride, are reluctant to be a blind instrument of
their game. So when Mr. Baburin [a member of the Supreme Soviet] tried
to scare the Kuril Islanders with the thought that "under the Japanese" they
would become "second-class" people, the response he received was
unexpected: "But we are second-class people already"."225
After Baburin's trip to the Kurils he said that "the social and economic
situation on the Kuril islands is very complicated: shipments of food, consumer
goods, and building materials are very light."226 He encouraged a resolution be
passed by the government and parliament on the development of the Kurils and
believed Japan "is trying to turn the Far East into its "raw material adjunct"."
Baburin is the leader of the "Russian Unity" a group of parliamentary
opposition to changing Russia's borders without approval of the Russian people
in a general referendum. Their view is in accordance with Article 8 of the
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Russian Federation's Declaration of State Sovereignty that says Russian territory
cannot be altered without a nationwide referendum.
Kamchatka officials, the territory located just north of the Kurils and part of
the Russian Far East, voted 50-50 on returning-not returning the islands to Japan.
Primyak, the Kamchatka Soviet Chairman, said that "however, I must tell Far East
residents that we must not proceed from some political or subjective interests. .
. . No matter what favorable conditions Japan offers them [the Kuril residents],
we can not [cannot] relocate people to other territories just because a foreign
country wishes it."227
A month later Vice-Chairman of the Russian Government Minister for the
Press and Information, Mikhail Poltoranin, stressed the need to carefully consider
the interests of the Kuril Islanders. He said, "If we get a number of dislodged
and homeless people, this may exhaust the people's patience and provoke a social
explosion."228
This was followed by a poll that showed that Russians were living difficult
times but were not ready for any social explosions. Most expressed hope and
rationality. The mood of hopelessness appeared unanimous in the 60-70 age
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group though. The poll did not specify whether Kuril Islanders were included
in the poll at all and probably they were not.
During the closed parliamentary hearings on the Kurils conducted in July,
the Sakhalin Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies said the "inhabitants of the Kurils
are today in despair."229 Another official, the General Staff of the Defense
Ministry, expressed concern that "under the conditions in which our people on
the Kurils live, we need either to adopt some solutions or to render effective
assistance in order that our people might live there."230
It was not until September that Yeltsin signed a resolution concerning a
program of socioeconomic development for the Kurils. Specifics were not
mentioned in this information release. In October the parliament discussed a
Kuril Islands development program. Again, there were no specifics outlined. By
this time Fyodorov demanded that the Kurils be made a free economic zone that
he said Yeltsin had promised. Again, no action by the officials in Moscow.
The discussions continued. On October 26 a draft plan was submitted
calling for the entire Sakhalin region be made into a free economic zone. The
proposal outlined the Kurils as a "sub-zone" that was expected to be "granted tax
and customs privileges in order to attract more Russian and foreign investors to
229






231 This was a long-term project but in the mean time the residents were still
suffering.
Fyodorov' s demand for a free economic zone was in conjunction with a
possible deal with a Hong Kong company, owned by a Japanese citizen, to
develop an amusement park on the Kurils. Why Fyodorov, who opposes
returning the islands, would favor a company owned by a Japanese is unknown.
Also, in the works was a South Korean businessman's offer to lease the Kuril
Islands. This offer was followed by the proposal, by a Russian Professor, to lease
the southern Kurils to the Japanese for 50 years or more. It seems as though the
plan to lease the land was a "political ploy" by Fyodorov to 'jumpstart' the
Moscow officials into action and it worked.
The plan by the Sakhalin officials made on 28 October said that Russia
would carry out a development plan as part of a program for a free economic
zone in the Kurils. The plan included introducing capital and technology from
leading developed countries, including Japan.
Within days the Supreme Soviet approved a plan to develop the Kurils as
part of a Sakhalin Free Economic Zone and on 17 November it was signed by
Yeltsin. But the plan would not be adopted until sometime in 1993 after
231
"Kuril Islands Development Plan To Be Submitted," OW1310161492 Moscow
Interfax in English 1434 GMT 13 Oct 92 (FBIS-SOV-92-202, 16 October 1992, p. 37).
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government committees "consider necessary revisions."232 The final plan is to
include "four regions according to purposes such as conservation, and promotion
of fisheries and the tourism industry centering on base cities."233 The plan also
stipulated that "local Soviets [have] the right to issue 99-year leases on land on the
islands to foreign investors."234 There was still no progress on meeting the
immediate needs of the residents.
E. RUSSIAN CITIZENS AND THE JAPANESE
It was announced in January by the Japanese government that Japan
intended on rendering urgent aid to the residents of the South Kuril Islands. The
food situation on the islands was worsening and the government of Japan and the
Japanese Red Cross would send 25 million yens by the end of the month.
The Russian Far East communities of Khabarovsk and Irkutsk both received
supplies and humanitarian assistance from their Japanese "Sister Cities" during
early February. Khabarovsk was sent 35 tons of humanitarian aid for 1,300 low-
income families by its Sister City, Niigata. Transportation, once the aid arrived
on Russian soil, was provided by the Far Eastern military. Irkutsk received a
232
"Moscow To Develop Kuril Islands as Free Economic Zone," OW2710043492





"Draft Edict Approves Leasing of Kuril Islands Land," MK0412163592 Moscow
Kommersant-Daily in Russian 2 Dec 92 pp 1-2 (FBIS-SOV-92-235, 7 December
1992, p. 14).
115
shipment of medical supplies for the Irkutsk Children's Hospital. Supplies
included diagnosing equipment, baby food, bandages, and other medical material.
Japan announced that from 8-10 February humanitarian aid worth $320,000
U.S. dollars would arrive for three different Far East communities, including
supplies for old people's home, hospitals, and children's residential homes. This
was the first shipment of a 52 million-dollar aid program for the Far East peoples.
An agreement for a credit of $100 million was also underway between Tokyo and
Moscow. Future negotiations included a discussion of credits of $500 million.
"The Japanese do not wish to link this aid to Japan's special economic
interests in the Far East,"235 the Japanese Embassy said. The receiving sites
were supposedly determined by a "matter of geographical proximity and the
practical implementation of the scheme."236
When the embassy official was asked: "Mr. Kawato, $50 million is a
comparatively small amount for a country as economically powerful as Japan. Do
you agree?" Kawato replied:
Well, it is said that you should not look a gift horse in the mouth. But
seriously, this is not a small total for humanitarian aid given free of charge.
It should also be kept in mind that there are countries in Africa and Asia
which have a greater need for aid than the CIS countries. Furthermore, I
should point out that the aid we are giving has been coordinated with other
Western countries. For instance, part of this consignment is to be delivered
235
"Japan Sends Aid to Vladivostok," LD0702215892 Moscow Russian Television





to the countries of Central Asia by American military aircraft from Turkey.
It will have a greater effect than it may appear.237
This was followed by a report that the Russian and Japanese governments
had agreed on visa-free travel for the residents of Sakhalin and the Kurils
beginning in April. Japanese citizens could also visit the southern Kuril Islands
without a visa beginning in May.
Russian and Japanese businessmen agreed to establish a mutual medical
fund for the areas of Siberia in April. Plans included joint ventures in building
medical centers and producing state of the art medical equipment and
pharmaceuticals. Two computerized tomography units (a type of X-ray machine)
had already been established on the grounds of a defense industry plant.
On a different level, Japan sent a group of specialists to the Ukraine to assist
in the safety and operation of nuclear power plants. The Japanese government
plans included sending specialists to the many nuclear plants in the former Soviet
Union to try to prevent Chernobyl-type disasters.
By May Japan had sent an additional shipment of humanitarian aid worth
1.45 million yen to the south Kurils and other areas of the Russian Far East. The
shipment to the Kurils included 1.8 tons of medicine and 60 tons of food
products.
237
"Official Interviewed on Aid," LD1002093892 Moscow Russian Television
Network in Russian 1249 GMT 9 Feb 92 (FBIS-SOV-92-028, 11 February 1992, p.
22).
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By mid-year numerous articles and broadcasts regarding the Kuril issue had
appeared in the Russian press and television and radio stations. During an
interview of the Ambassador of Japan in Russia, the Japanese said, "If the Russian
side recognizes our sovereignty over the islands, the Japanese government will
adopt a respectful attitude toward the rights, interests, and wishes of the present
inhabitants, including those who wish to remain."238
By this time most of the Islanders were receiving much more aid and
assistance from Japan than from their own government. The Russian government
was in the middle of their debates over resolving the territorial issue and deciding
how to influence Japan to contribute a large sum toward the country's economic
reforms.
The Japanese were patiently promoting their own program by sending the
aid and influencing the people to be in favor of returning the islands. Before
Yeltsin's trip to Japan was "postponed" Japan's Prime Minister Miyazawa said, "It
is particularly noteworthy that there has been great progress in the sphere of
human contacts and cultural ties. I would like the Russian people to realize that
as a result of these achievements, Japan is sincere in its desire to create long-term
friendly relations with Russia."239
"Opposing Views on Kuril Islands Compared," 924C1990A Moscow
Argumenty I Fakty in Russian No 27, Jul 92 p 4 (FBIS-USR-92-099, 5 August 1992,
p. 75).
239
"Japan's Miyazawa Assesses Prospects for Ties," PM0909094192 Moscow
Komsomolskaya Pravda in Russian 8 Sep 92 p 3 (FBIS-SOV-92-174, 8 September
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Concern was expressed by the Russian interviewer about how to dispel the
doubts "held by many of my fellow citizens - who believe that, as soon as it gets
what it wants, Japan will coldly turn its back on Russia."240 Miyazawa replied
that a resolution of the territorial dispute and conclusion of a peace treaty would
"create an atmosphere of genuinely mutual trust"241 between the two countries.
Miyazawa explained that in this world that is "multipolar politically" and
"without state borders economically" that it was in the interest of all countries to
proceed from a base of mutual trust. But Japan could not be totally giving in an
atmosphere of mutual distrust that the two countries were trying to resolve to the
satisfaction of both.
During this interview Miyazawa was very complimentary to the Russia
people and optimistic about the future of Russia:
... I believe that the Russian people have many assets when it comes to
development. Needless to say, these are their high educational and scientific
standards, and moreover, the desire in many citizens to work hard. I have
heard how well Russian people can work if given the conditions to do a
meaningful job and show initiative. Russians have rich creative
imaginations. These factors will make themselves fully felt as long as an
environment guaranteeing free economic activity is provided. In this
environment, the young people currently growing up under democratic
conditions and burning with a desire to do business will undoubtedly play









Before Yeltsin's trip was "postponed," the Russian media published an article
concerning an appeal made to the Constitutional Court regarding the Japanese
Embassy issuing a brochure titled "Northern Territories of Japan." The appeal's
author believed it was imperative that the Court examine and explain the action
of the Japanese Embassy that the appeal said was illegal.
The Japanese Embassy had released the brochure, about 60,000 copies, to the
Russian public to educate the people about both sides of the issue. They believed
many people were not aware of the whole story. The results of the appeal are not
known but the Japanese Embassy achieved their goal if only in a small way.
After Yeltsin's trip was "postponed" the Japanese export-import bank,
financed by the Japanese government, released documents granting a 100 million
U.S. dollar credit that had been approved two years earlier. Credit documents
were expected to be signed by Yeltsin during his visit but were eventually signed
in Moscow. The credit would be used to pay for goods already delivered from
Japan including medicines, medical equipment, food and wrapping.
In addition, plans went forward for a scheduled aid meeting between Tokyo
and Moscow on 29-30 October. One important item to be discussed at this
meeting was the protection of aid shipments to all the CIS countries. Black
marketeers were stealing part or all of the shipments (from all the CIS countries)
for their own use. This problem has not been resolved yet. In his opening
remarks at the meeting Watanabe announced that the CIS countries, excluding the
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Baltics, will receive 100 million dollars in gratis humanitarian aid from the
Japanese government.
Tokyo planned to give priority to the Far Eastern areas for most of the aid
(60%). Sometime in the future the aid would be supplied to the other parts of the
former Soviet Union, especially the Central Asian republics. Technical assistance
would also be provided to the Central Asian republics to train 300 engineers and
experts in Japan over the next three years.
By the end of the year Tokyo and Moscow had also agreed to expand flights
between Japan and Europe via Siberia. In addition, flights between Niigata, a
Japanese city along the Sea of Japan, and Vladivostok in the Russian Far East and
a new route between Hakodate, on Hokkaido island, and Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk in
the Far East would be opened.
Regarding the visa-free travel between Hokkaido and the Kurils, the length
and scope of the visits were expanded by mutual agreement. The visa-free
exchanges are a way to promote friendship and cooperation between the two
countries' citizens. They also agreed to allow visitors to stay in hotels than on
board ships, to seek ways to include children's groups in the exchanges, and to
use helicopters for making the visits.
F. SUMMARY
Apparently the residents of the Kurils Islands are under a tremendous
hardship even more than they were when the Communists were in power.
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Though it is not clear if most of the population of the Kurils or, for that matter,
the Russian Federation agrees about how to solve the territorial dispute with
Japan. It is not evident whether the interests of the residents or Russian citizens
are important to the Russian government until public pressure forces them into
some action. This action, by the end of the year, was only verbal nothing in the
form of deeds.
On the other hand Japan is playing its card in winning the support of the
Russian population and the Far Easterners and Kuril Islanders, in particular.
Japan may be betting that once things settle down in Moscow Article 8 of the
Constitution may be administered - a vote of the people to decide any possible
changes in the territorial integrity of the Federation. The Japanese government
may believe the issue may be settled this way since both, the Russian people and
Moscow officials, are feuding as to the legality and justice of the issue in regards
to international law. Either way the Japanese citizens and government are
pursuing both ends of the spectrum just in case.
Until the larger issues of reform are settled between Yeltsin and the
parliament, the Kuril Islanders, the Russian people, and the Japanese will all have
to wait for this issue to be resolved. And this may take more years than the
residents can bear. The media, officials in Moscow and in the Far East, and the
public at large seem content to debate the issue endlessly. They tend to use this
issue as a stepping stone to what they consider more critical issues for the
Russian Federation to tackle.
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All sides shrewdly used the method of appealing to public opinion with no
one side coming out the winner. What was achieved was postponing the
adoption of a decision. What is still apparent to some Russia citizens, in a post-
Soviet climate, "public opinion is still "made" with the help of propaganda media
no less successfully than in the totalitarian Union, and for this reason its
significance should not be exaggerated."243
It goes back to a larger debate happening in the Russia during 1992 and into
this year. Conservative-nationalists, including Governor Fyodorov, who believe
"Russia is on the verge of a major political scandal caused by officials who are
guided by self-interest"244 and democrat-liberals, such as Foreign Minister
Kozyrev and Yeltsin, who want to resolve the issue based on "legality and justice"
to enable Russia to become a respected member of the community of nations.
Who is caught in between or, more accurately, out in the cold - the Kuril
Islanders.
In January 1992, immediately after Gorbachev's resignation and before the
Kuril Island debates became heated within the government and the public, a
Russian journalist wrote, "In Russia's present situation none of its citizens will feel
243
"Lack of Russian 'Concrete Political Decisions' on Kurils Noted," 924C1450A
Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta in Russian 6 May 92 pp 1-2 (FBIS-USR-92-063, 29
May 1992, p. 1).
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"Opposition Demands Investigation of MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]
Activities," 924C2108C Moscow Rossivskiye Vesti in Russian 11 Aug 92 p 2 (FBIS-
USR-92-111, 30 August 1992, p. 55).
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bitter if the President [Yeltsin] leaves the decision of the territorial dispute to our
future generations."245 This journalist reasoned, why give the nationalists
another opportunity to attack Yeltsin when the democrats were in the process of
carrying out difficult economic and political reforms.
The debates shifted from a primarily military significance to one of concern
for the fate of the citizens. But the government did nothing to make the fate of
the citizens any better and are no closer to an internal compromise or a resolution
with Japan. Mlechin continued, "If the Russian government intends to devise a
formula for avoiding the answer to this question [of returning or not returning
the islands] it is better not to go to Japan at all."246





A. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
At this writing, the Russian Federation and Japan have not signed a peace
treaty and the South Kuril Islands remain in the hands of the Russians. After one
year improvement in Russian-Japanese relations has not increased significantly
but there have been noticeable changes. There are signs that both sides are
willing to consider compromises and that negotiations on not only the island
dispute, but also economic and security issues, will continue.
This does not suggest that the territorial demarcation issue will be resolved
or a peace treaty signed during this century. What the evidence does suggest are
continued bilateral discussions on many matters important in an atmosphere that
is seemingly cooperative and friendly, although reserved.
"A history of the territorial dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union
shows that the Soviet position has not been uniform and has shifted depending
upon the results it wanted to gain from Japan."247 The foreign policy of the
successor of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, has used the same tactics
during its first year of independence.
247 Pushpa Thambipillai and Daniel C. Matuszewski, The Soviet Union and the
Asia-Pacific Region (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), p. 28.
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In the beginning of 1992 Russia accused Japan of tying political and
economic policy into one inseparable package. Russians insisted the two must be
divided and treated as individual issues between the two countries. By the end
of the year, the Russians hinted that if Tokyo would come forth with even more
economic assistance then Moscow might consider discussing the island issue.
Never have the Russians negotiated the possible return of all four islands.
They have specifically mentioned, as a basis for negotiations, only the two
southernmost islands that were agreed to in the 1956 Declaration. Conservative
government and military officials in Moscow hinted that economic assistance from
Japan could provide a basis for continued negotiations on a peace treaty.
One other issue was important to both the Japanese and Russians,
demilitarization of the entire area. This implies that American troop levels must
be reduced to assure mutual feelings of border integrity and security. The
Russian military leadership is also concerned about the increase of the Japanese
self-defense program.
The Russians have continued the Soviet policy of shifting positions on
further negotiations depending on what they wanted Japan to do. If Japan
complies, negotiations may move from the discussion stage to signing mutual
agreements. Japan has already offered more economic assistance and has
affirmed their position of multilateral support as a member of the Group of
Seven.
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Russian officials will not forget that Japan internationalized an issue that,
they believe, should have continued as a bilateral discussion only. On the other
hand, Russia is counting on Western support, especially from the G-7, more than
she was this time last year.
The territorial dispute goes much further than these surface level analyses.
Historical and cultural barriers are not expected to be broken down during one
year of discussions and it is highly probable that the last step in Yeltsin's five-
stage plan will happen. His fifth step includes leaving the territorial discussions
for future generations to resolve. Thompson argued in his thesis over ten years
ago:
The territorial issue is only a symptomatic manifestation of the basic
disparities of their national paradigms. ... if the Northern Territories did
not exist, there would most likely be some other issue that would prevent
closer relations. But the biggest obstacle to improving Japanese-Soviet
relations is the legacy of their historical experiences. The Soviets remember
the Japanese surprise attack on their naval fores at Port Arthur and the
Russian people's shameful defeat by an Asian nation; they remember the
Siberian Intervention led by the Japanese and Tokyo's early anti-bolshevism;
they remember the Manchurian border clashes of the late 1930's and the rise
of Japanese militarism; they are concerned over the massive economic,
technological, and increasing (from their perspective) military power that is
displayed in Japan; and they understand the significance of the Sino-
Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and its anti-hegemony clause.248
There is a light at the end of the tunnel. The Cold War is over and the
newly independent Russian Federation is moving toward democracy, free market
economics, and a social transformation. Yeltsin may have made the same mistake
248 Michael A. Thompson, "The Northern Territories: Case Study in Japanese-
Soviet Relations," (Master's Thesis, T4355) Naval Postgraduate School, June 1982.
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as Gorbachev did by "trying to transform the political and economic systems
simultaneously"249 when the political structures and institutions are too weak
to support such reforms. The parliament still holds more power than the
President and the struggle for power are the most crucial battles right now for the
Russians. Until the political arena is stabilized and reforms are moving smoothly
along the Japanese may as well bide their time as patiently as they have for the
past forty-seven years.
Another reform that must be moved along is the education and training of
people in many unfamiliar areas. Democratic principles, capitalism, principles of
law, and even a new approach to the discipline of history must be included in a
revised education program:
The time has come for considered and competent analysis rather than
emotion. The general public should first and foremost be made aware of
historical facts and diplomatic documents determining mutual relations with
Japan, rather than the views of various figures. This is important, since the
final decision on the fate of the Kurils must without fail be made and
approved by the people. And primarily by those who live on the Kurils.
Furthermore, they should express their agreement or disagreement only on
the basis of profound understanding of the essence of the problems.250
249 Alexander Rahr, "The First Year of Russian Independence," RFE/RL Research
Reports, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1 January 1993), p. 50.
250 Article by Vice-Admiral of the Research Yu. Bystrov under the "Problems and
Opinions" rubric: "Islands of Contention," "Kuril Islands 'Fate' Rests With
People," PM25021 15792 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 20 Feb 92 p 3 (FBIS-
SOV-92-038, 26 February 1992, p. 32).
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The people may vote sometime in the future on a referendum on adjusting the
territorial border of the country, specifically the border line between the Kurils
and Japan. This vote is not likely to occur until the next century.
The end of the Cold War has seen more than a rebirth of nationalism.
Nationalism has risen to the surface where before it was suppressed, usually by
fear. This, in combination with a protectionist attitude, has made it difficult for
the Russians to define their national interests to fit the new world order. The
internal political struggles to define national interests, to listen to the people's
voices, and the battles for power are some struggles that the Russians are
becoming more familiar with. Political ineptitude will continue for several years
due to the lack of a solid foundation of laws and a court system.
This transformation is not an easy one for a postcommunist society and the
world should not expect overnight miracles. The process will take many years,
if not several generations. Government gridlock makes it impossible to carry out
economic and political reforms. The relationship with Japan and other countries
will take second place behind the internal struggles. The key will be to continue
support for democratic processes that have emerged during the past year. Japan
has realized that she must extend that support in verbal commitments followed
by economic, security-related, and cultural deeds. It is not in Tokyo's interest for
the anti-democratic and anti-Western Russians to win the political struggle.
It seems as though one common thread holds all the Russians together: This
is the desire to be a world power. Without continued and consistent economic
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and political reform this will not be possible. Without Western support economic
and political reform in the Russian Federation may or may not be possible. The
Russians realize that they must transform their own country into whatever model
they choose since the ultimate outcome is a country considered a world power.
For many that means a friendly, cooperative member of the world
community not a return to the Cold War or totalitarianism. Russia is still
struggling with the basics in deciding its identity, its national interests, and its
place in the world. The Russians can negotiate with the Japanese when they are
on an equal footing, from a position of strength, not while they are struggling for
their existence and feel humiliated and manipulated.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PACIFIC BASIN
The lessening of tensions between Moscow and Tokyo creates a lessening
of tensions in the entire Pacific Basin. The other countries of the Pacific Rim are
watching Tokyo and Moscow carefully. They are also watching the relationship
between Japan and the United States carefully. Washington intends to reduce the
level of American troops in the Pacific and have encouraged Japan to take more
responsibility for its own self-defense. Japan's neighbors are not happy about this
proposal. All the countries seem wary of Japan's possible militarization especially
with the reduced Soviet threat in the Pacific.
As General Colin L. Powell wrote in his 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions
and Functions of the Armed Forces report:
130
Asia represents a remarkable US foreign policy success. American
commitments to mutual defense treaties, forward military presence, security
assistance and education programs - for example - have helped produce a
region of stability. Democracy now blooms in areas where only a few years
ago we wondered if the idea could ever take root. Newly empowered
citizens are forcing governments to change in ways once unimaginable.
Political and economic success in Asia make it possible for friends and
allies like Japan to take on a larger share of regional security
responsibilities. But challenges to American interests and ideals also exist
across the Pacific. Communist regimes remain in power in China, North
Korea, Laos, and Vietnam. While leadership and generational changes
underway in these states offer grounds for optimism, the outcome of these
transitions is far from certain. American involvement in Asia and the
Pacific is essential for promoting stability and nurturing constructive
change.251
The fact that Tokyo and Moscow have continued discussions and plan to
resume negotiations is a positive sign for the entire Pacific Basin. Discussions on
security-related issues and economic partnerships are desired and needed by the
regions' countries, including the United States. Moscow has proposed collective
security arrangements consummated in a multilateral treaty. This would be a
more effective system then the current situation of many bilateral arrangements.
Powell's view is different: "In the Pacific region, the key to our forward presence
has been and will remain a network of largely bilateral security alliances with
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand - and
cooperation with other friendly nations."252
251 Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "1993 Report on the
Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces," Washington, D. C. (10
February 1993), p. 1-5 (bold added by the author).
252
Ibid, p. 111-33; New Zealand was not included in Powell's comment (bold
added by the author).
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Powell says that "despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, our presence
there remains a vital aspect of our forward deployed posture."253 He then seems
to contradict himself: "Given the great distances associated with the Pacific
theater, forces maintained in Japan could deal with a wide range of local and
regional contingencies."254 It is unsure whether American troop presence in the
Pacific will or will not be reduced. The Russians have implied that a lower troop
presence in the Pacific northwest, including Japan, will help with the negotiations
toward the peace treaty and resolution of the territorial dispute. It is unclear
whether their wishes will be granted.
Cultural differences present another problem that can be overcome, as they
have been to a certain extent. The Chinese and the Russians have settled their
border dispute and signed a mutual agreement package as has Moscow with
South Korea. Kozyrev was invited and did attend the ASEAN meeting in Manila
last summer. All these steps are positive outcomes of one year's hard work of the
Russian Foreign Ministry.
A reconciliation and normalization of relations between Japan and the
Russian Federation will be the most positive steps toward common security
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